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ABSTRACT
Cyber attacks on financial and government institutions, critical infrastructure, vot-
ing systems, businesses, modern vehicles, etc., are on the rise. Fully connected au-
tonomous vehicles are more vulnerable than ever to hacking and data theft. This is
due to the fact that the protocols used for in-vehicle communication i.e. controller
area network (CAN), FlexRay, local interconnect network (LIN), etc., lack basic se-
curity features such as message authentication, which makes it vulnerable to a wide
range of attacks including spoofing attacks. This research presents methods to pro-
tect the vehicle against spoofing attacks. The proposed methods exploit uniqueness
in the electronic control unit electronic control unit (ECU) and the physical chan-
nel between transmitting and destination nodes for linking the received packet to the
source. Impurities in the digital device, physical channel, imperfections in design, ma-
terial, and length of the channel contribute to the uniqueness of artifacts. I propose
novel techniques for electronic control unit (ECU) identification in this research to
address security vulnerabilities of the in-vehicle communication. The reliable ECU-
identification has the potential to prevent spoofing attacks launched over the CAN due
to the inconsideration of the message authentication. In this regard, my techniques
models the ECU-specific random distortion caused by the imperfections in digital-to-
analog converter digital to analog converter (DAC), and semiconductor impurities in
the transmitting ECU for fingerprinting. I also model the channel-specific random
distortion, impurities in the physical channel, imperfections in design, material, and
length of the channel are contributing factors behind physically unclonable artifacts.
The lumped element model is used to characterize channel-specific distortions. This
xiii
research exploits the distortion of the device (ECU) and distortion due to the channel
to identify the transmitter and hence authenticate the transmitter.
xiv
CHAPTER I
Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to provide the introduction of the disserta-
tion. Section 1.1 provides the motivation to implement security in modern electric
vehicle, which is followed by the research objectives in section 1.2. Original contribu-
tions of this research are reported in section 1.3. Threat model is presented in section
1.4. Finally the complete outline of dissertation is provided in section 1.5.
1.1 Motivation
The modern vehicle is a cyber-physical system (CPS) equipped with many wire-
less and wired communication interfaces and a large number of microcontrollers and
electronic control units (ECUs) networked via various in-vehicle networks (IVNs)
(1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8), such as CAN (8), LIN (1), media oriented system trans-
port (MOST) (2), FlexRay (3), etc., that connect safety-critical components of the
vehicle, including brakes, airbags, engine control, and active safety devices, e.g., elec-
tronic stability program, adaptive cruise control, and so on. Integration of wireless
interfaces, e.g., Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, etc., with IVNs and use of the legacy CAN pro-
tocol for in-vehicle control communication pose serious security threats to connected
autonomous vehicles (AVs) (9).
Advances in-vehicle technologies are unable to keep pace with the growing attack
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surfaces and vectors, leaving millions of vehicles vulnerable to a wide range of attacks
e.g. man-in-the-middle, and packet spoofing (10; 11; 12; 13). This is due to the fact
that the automotive industry is still relying on the legacy controller area network
(CAN) protocol for in-vehicle communication among ECUs. Whereas, CAN protocol
lacks basic security features such as message authentication, confidentiality, and in-
tegrity, thus cause the CAN as an easy victim of attack through ECUs (14; 15; 16).
The ECUs on the in-vehcile network therefore are vulnerable to various attacks, in-
cluding packet spoofing attacks, data injection attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks
etc., that can defect the vehicle. Recently, researchers have successfully hijacked ve-
hicles from a remote location, and killed the vehicle engine in middle of a highway
(16).
Researchers have proposed various solutions to detect and prevent attacks on the
CAN protocol for in-vehicle control networks. These methods can be classified into
two categories: (i) message authentication code (MAC)-based approaches (17; 18; 19;
20; 21; 22; 23; 24), and (ii) intrusion detection-based approaches (25; 26; 27; 28; 29;
30; 31; 32; 33; 34; 35; 36; 37; 38; 39; 40; 41; 42; 43; 44; 45; 46).
The MAC-based methods, achieve security and privacy by encrypting the payload
of the CAN-packet before transmission. For instance, in (17), Wang et. al. demon-
strated a MAC-based framework VeCure for CAN security. In VeCure, 64-bit MAC
for every 64-bit message was transmitted between the ECUs. Intuitively, the method
exhibited high computational cost, 50% additional transmission overhead, and also
required a higher data rate. In (21), Hiroshi et. al. designed an authentication mech-
anism for the CAN protocol against spoofing attacks. The monitoring node provided
the authentication code for all ECUs and verified the code for all CAN messages. In
(19), Hazem et. al. proposed a lightweight CAN authentication protocol (LCAP).
The LCAP required to append a “magic number” that was generated by a one-way
hash function employed on TESLA prototype (47). The protocol required 16-bits of
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the data field to append the authentication code, which still creates 25% overhead.
The MAC-based approaches have the intrinsic overhead that lowers the transmission
performance, hence makes them unreliable for the CAN security (17; 46; 23).
To address the limitations of MAC-based solutions, researchers have proposed
intrusion detection-based approaches for CAN network traffic analysis (26; 27; 21;
19; 48). The intrusion detection-based approaches have lower data rate requirements
because no additional bits are transmitted during the message transmission; hence,
it does not add additional network overhead. In (26), Cho and Shin demonstrated a
clock-based intrusion detection system (CIDS) that used ECU fingerprinting. Each
ECU contained a crystal oscillator known as a clock; the ECU fingerprinting measured
the clock skewness against the received packets and detect the attack. However, Sang
et. al. (28) and Tayyab et. al. (49) demonstrated that CIDS can be bypassed by esti-
mating the clock parameters. In (46), message authentication was performed through
ECU detection by applying higher-order moments of the CAN signal in both times-
and frequency-domains. However, the approach was intolerant against the transmit-
ter induction and the performance of the system seriously decays if the number of
transmitters is increased. Therefore, I need an IDS-based approach that extracts
unique fingerprints from the signal, works for a higher number of transmitters, and
also exhibits low computational complexity.
To address the aforementioned limitations of existing in-vehicle security tech-
niques, novel IDS-based message authentication approaches are presented in this re-
search. My approach exploits the two types of distortions.
• Device-specific distortion
• Channel-specific distortion
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1.1.1 Device-specific Distortion
In the first part of this research, my approach exploits the uniqueness in device-
specific distortions e.g., semiconductor impurities, DC offset, aliasing error, the mis-
match between the nominal and measured values of electric components in DAC, etc.,
for message fingerprint generation. I hypothesize that distortions due to digital-to-
analog conversion operation at the ECU output are device-dependent that can be
used to link the received packet to the transmitting ECU. Therefore, I associate the
received packet through a specific ECU, and the ECU-pin responsible for message
transmission.
1.1.2 Channel-specific Distortion
In the second part of this research, my approach exploits the uniqueness in
channel-specific distortions. I also hypothesize that the distortion in the signal be-
haves like a unique signature, which can be used to link the signal to the channel and
hence the transmitter. The proposed research exploits uniqueness in the channel-
specific distortion for linking the received CAN packet to the transmitting source.
The impurities in the physical channel, imperfections in design, material, and length
of the channel contribute to the uniqueness. The lumped element model (LEM) for
transmission lines is used to characterize channel artifacts.
1.2 Research Objectives
There are 2 main objectives of this research:
1.2.1 ECU and Pin Level Uniqueness
The first objective of this research is: (i) to investigate ECU-level uniqueness for a
given network and (ii) to investigate pin-level uniqueness for a given ECU to authen-
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ticate the message. The proposed method relies on distinctive physical artifacts of
the DAC of the transmitting ECU for device-level fingerprinting. The imperfections
in material, design, fabrication of DAC are contributing factors that create distortion
in the ECU signal. I perform the statistical modeling of this distortion and use it as
a feature vector for transmitter identification (i.e. transmitting ECU, and ECU-pin)
through neural network architecture.
1.2.2 Channel Level Uniqueness
The second objective of this research is to investigate channel-level uniqueness
for a given network. The proposed method relies on distinctive physical artifacts
of the channel, for channel fingerprinting. Material and design imperfections in the
physical channel and length of channel are the main contributing factors behind the
channel-specific unique artifacts, are leveraged to link the received electrical signal
to the transmitter. I performed the statistical modeling of this distortion, then there
are two approaches used for channel identification.
• Non-parametric approach (Neural network based approach)
• Parametric approach (Maximum Likelihood Ratio Test)
1.3 Contributions
Thus, the main contributions of this dissertation are:
• I provide a mathematical model of the distortion sources i.e. imperfections in
the material, design, fabrication of DAC.
• I propose a statistical model of the device (ECU)-level distortion for transmitter
identification.
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• I also propose that different transmitting pins in a single device have unique
distortion and can be used for ECU-pin identification.
• I provide a mathematical model of the distortion sources i.e. manufacturing
imperfections, design imperfections of channel
• Model the channel-specific distortion for CAN channel.
• Channel-specific distortion extraction and its uniqueness analysis
• Propose a reliable framework neural network based approach for linking received
CAN packet to the true transmitting source.
• Propose a parametric approach which estimates multiple density functions of
distortion, and adopt the best fit density function to identify the source trans-
mitter. In my case, the gamma distribution function is the best fit density
function that is used to compute the α and β parameters of the gamma distri-
bution. Through empirical analysis, I observed that the parameters α and β
have random nature thus can also be represented through the gamma function,
which in this case is the Gaussian function. Afterward, for a test signal, α and
β are computed, that are then used to identify the channel for message authen-
tication and attack prevention through a novel modified likelihood approach.
1.4 Threat Model
In the threat model, I have two types of threats. The first threat is from physical
access, and the second threat is from wireless access as shown in Fig. 1.1. The physical
access threat means that the adversary physically removes one of the ECUs from the
vehicle and connects it’s own ECU for injecting malicious messages. The second threat
is from wireless access in which the adversary injects a message in the CAN using a
wireless interface like radio, Wifi, vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication etc. This
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Figure 1.1: Threat model for in-vehicle communication
research is robust against ECU impersonation attacks that are launched through the
physical access of the car e.g. the adversary attacks the CAN through physical access
by deploying a new ECU. Since the distortion in the signal is dependent on DAC
and material imperfections, the feature vector estimated will be different as well,
the message will not be authenticated and attack will be identified. Moreover, my
approach is also effective for attacks launched through wireless interface e.g. attack
launched on the infotainment system to access CAN as done by Miller et. al. (50).
Given a vehicle network as shown in Fig. 1.2, suppose that an adversary tries
to penetrate the vehicle network through the wireless interface of the infotainment
system with the help of a CAN message, which is for the braking system. In CAN mes-
sage, the information about the sender is missing, as the messages are functionality-
based. However, the fingerprinting ECU will correctly recognize the ECU, it will not
authenticate this message as it is coming from the wrong sender, and it will send a
warning signal to braking unit ECU. Now, the ECU braking unit knows not to apply
the brakes since the CAN message for applying brakes is not supposed to come from
7
Figure 1.2: Attack detection for in-vehicle communication
the infotainment system.
1.5 Dissertation Outline
The rest of this dissertation is organized into nine chapters. The brief summary
of each of these chapters is as follows:
For in-vehicle communication, different protocols i.e. CAN, LIN, Flexray et. are
used. The security systems proposed in this research are protocol independent, as
physical signal is used for fingerprinting ECUs. In Chapter-II, an overview and com-
parison of CAN, Flexray and LIN protocols is presented.
Intrusion detection based approaches are further subdivided into: (a) parameter
monitoring based approaches (b) information theory based approaches (c) machine
learning based approaches and (d) fingerprinting based approaches. Chapter-III out-
lines the related work to my research.
Chapter-IV provides a novel technique for electronic control unit (ECU) iden-
tification based on ECU distortion address security vulnerabilities of the controller
area network (CAN) protocol. In this regard, my technique models the ECU-specific
random distortion caused by the imperfections in digital-to-analog converter, and
semiconductor impurities in the transmitting ECU for fingerprinting.
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Chapter-V is about using a the lumped element model to characterize the channel-
specific step response. ECU and channel imperfections lead to a unique transfer
function for each transmitter. Due to the unique transfer function, the step response
for each transmitter is unique. In this section, control system parameters are used as
a feature-set, afterward, a neural network is used transmitting node identification for
message authentication.
Chapter-VI proposes a method exploits physical unclonable attributes in the phys-
ical channel between transmitting and destination nodes and uses them for linking the
received packet to the source. Non-parametric modeling is used to estimate distortion
distribution, which is used for transmitting node identification. A neural network is
trained to identify the channel and hence transmitter.
Chapter-VII also exploits channel distortion for message authentication, a novel,
computationally efficient parametric approach is developed to quantify the distortion
in form of probability density function (PDF). The best fit PDF over histogram of
distortion, is gamma distribution function. Afterwards, the α and β parameters of
gamma distribution function are computed for multiple records in each channel to
obtain the joint density function. Finally, the likelihood ratio test is applied on joint
density function to identify the channel and transmitter.
Chapter-VIII concludes this dissertation and describe the future perspectives of
the research.
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CHAPTER II
Overview of CAN, FlexRay and LIN Protocol
CAN, FlexRay and LIN protocols are commonly used for modern in-vehicle com-
munication. A modern vehicle contains 70 to 100 ECUs. This chapter presents
a literature review of these protocols. The communication cycle, process, message
structure, and hardware elements are discussed for all three protocols. Performance
is measured in terms of reliability and latency. In addition, a comparison between
the CAN, FlexRay, and LIN protocols is made. Study shows that CAN protocol
has advantages when it comes to real-time priority-based communication. However,
if all the events have equal priority, then FlexRay works well. The LIN protocol is
budget-friendly and has the lowest cost in all 3 protocols but at the same time, it is
unreliable.
The rapid advancement in the automotive industry increases the demand for de-
veloping remarkably efficient communication techniques in order to provide higher
bandwidth for better data rates. To examine this issue, the most recent interfac-
ing systems for in-vehicle networking are introduced in this comparative study. The
discussed methods are represented in CAN, FlexRay, and LIN protocols. Each pro-
tocol is suitable for a set of specific applications that perform a certain group of
purposes and combined will form a complete communication network that connects
the intra-vehicle control units in one fully functional system.
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The distinctive and quick development in digital and computer hardware technol-
ogy inspired the automotive world to advance in communication and networking for
the in-vehicle network area. As a result of the technological advancement in com-
munication systems, electronic systems in vehicles are becoming more diverse and
complex structurally and functionally to cope with the new innovations, providing
further convenient and efficient services for drivers to confidently monitor the in-
ternal and the external performances of the system. Ultrasonic sensors, radar, and
cameras are utilized to control the internal performance of the vehicle (51; 52; 53). To
maintain a high level of safety to drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, the systems are
particularly constructed to monitor the surrounding environment of the vehicle (51).
Furthermore, the infotainment system is being added due to its importance in con-
nectivity such as Bluetooth, navigation, smartphones, and audio system (51; 52; 53).
Data traffic, latency, and jitter in the network may cause a delay in services. How-
ever, this issue can be controlled, and the bandwidth can also be maximized through
the Quality of Service (QoS) measurements. This can vary with different functions of
the in-vehicle communication, which can be mainly classified into time-dependent and
independent functions, or real-time and non-real time functions for controlling mes-
sage transmission between ECUs (51; 54). Examples of real-time applications, which
are represented by using CAN, LIN, and FlexRay protocols, are the braking, steering,
engine control, transmission, multimedia, human machine interface (HMI), telematics
audio, and seating systems (51; 52; 53; 55; 54). One the other hand, FlexRay protocol
is also considered more of a hybrid system technology that can be a time-triggered
or an event-triggered protocol (51; 55; 54). All automotive networking methods are
dedicated to communicating signals effectively among the control units to improve
message transmission safety, lowering the cost of cabling, maximizing bandwidth, and
saving package space (51; 56; 57).
The overview and a comparative study are discussed in detail. This chapter is
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organized in the following fashion: Section 2.1 is an overview of CAN. Section 2.2 is
an overview of FlexRay. Section 2.3 is an overview of LIN. Section 2.4 is a comparison
study between CAN vs. FlexRay, LIN vs. CAN, and LIN vs. FlexRay.
2.1 CAN- an Overview
In the 1980s, the CAN bus protocol was proposed by Robert Bosch GmbH (58).
This robust system has been broadly applicable in communication and networking ar-
eas such as automotive networking systems, medical appliances, entertainment realm,
and domestic apparatus (58). In the pre-CAN bus era, the message exchange for
point-to-point communication systems was mainly based on source and destination
addresses. After the CAN bus system was introduced, broadcast communication was
utilized, where every node via the bus can transmit and receive message. Unlike
the traditional method, the CAN bus system added more flexibility to the network-
ing technology. This makes adding further nodes to the network more possible and
convenient, and it will not affect the main structure of the network system and the
existing nodes as well. CAN bus uses a multi-master configuration (23) which allows
the transmission or reception of the messages via any node when the bus is free. This
also guarantees a fixed delay duration. CAN bus is an event-triggered protocol (23)
in which the message is initiated as a response to a triggered event or request in the
network (23; 46).
As a real-time system, for every message on CAN bus there is a unique pri-
ority depending on the message identifier (ID) that exists in each message frame
(23; 42; 59; 49). If the message has the lowest ID, it will have the highest priority to
pass through the bus and vice versa (46). Furthermore, via the message arbitration
technique, the bus collision is avoided due to a message prioritization feature, where
nodes on the CAN bus send messages consecutively and the message with the lowest
identification value will have the priority to transmit on the bus (42; 46). CAN bus
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utilizes broadcasting communication topology for sending messages by using differen-
tial signaling mode at the physical layer, which is represented by two communication
twisted pair wires, CAN High (CANH) and CAN Low (CANL) (42; 46). The signal
transmission methodology of CAN bus is represented by 1s, recessive bits, and 0s,
dominant bits. In idle mode, where the recessive bit (1s) is transmitted, CANH and
CANL are set to 2.5 volts, causing the voltage between the wires to be zero (42; 46).
When the dominant bits (0s) is transmitted, CANH rises to 3.5 volts and CANL
goes to 1.5 volts, where the voltage difference between the two wires is becoming 2
volts (42; 46; 60). CAN bus topology is illustrated in Fig. 2.1 (46). For example,
three nodes in binary (23) (Node 1: 11001011111, Node 2:110011111111, and Node 3:
110010110010) attempt to transmit messages simultaneously. However, the message
which is assigned the lowest identity (third node) will broadcast the information first.
Hence, the bus collision is prevented. The scenario above is illustrated in Fig. 2.2,
(23).
Figure 2.1: CAN signalling mode
There are two common CAN-bus formats which are the Standard format, where
an 11-bit Identifier frame is used, and the Extended format, which implements a 29-
bit Identifier frame (61; 49; 46). Other major frames include Data Frame, Remote
Frame, Overload Frame, and Error Frame.
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Figure 2.2: Arbitration field operation in CAN
1. Data Frame: The purpose of the data frame is to convey messages from sender
to receiver. As illustrated in Fig. 2.3 (23) this frame comprises a 1-bit start frame,
12-bit Arbitration Field, 6-bit Control Field, a Data Field ranging from 0-64 bits,
16-bit CRC Field, 2-bit ACK field, and a 7-bit End of frame field, respectively. In
the arbitration field, the message priority is defined and a single bit decides whether
a data frame or a remote frame will be transmitted. The control field decides the size
of the data frame. The CRC Field contains 15 bits for a Cyclic Redundant Checksum
algorithm is implemented to detect errors, and uses one recessive bit delimiter (23).
In ACK field acknowledgement occurs as part of the communication protocol; the
message from the CRC field is being received and detected in ACK field for any
possibility of error occurrence. If there is no error detected and the data matches the
original message, then it will be reported to the transmitter that the sent message
is being validated and received accurately. This process happens by replacing the
recessive bit with a dominant bit in the ACK field (23; 60).
Figure 2.3: Data frame of CAN
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2. Remote Frame: The remote frame in general is made of five fields which are
a 13-bit Arbitration Field, 6-bit Control Field, 16-bit CRC Field, 2-bit ACK field,
and 7-bit End of Frame Field. Fig. 2.4 (23) shows the full depiction of the Remote
Frame structure, which closely resembles the Data Frame. The primary difference is
that the Remote Frame does not transmit data; instead, the Remote Frame creates
a sender response to the requested data from the receiver (with the same identifier)
(23; 60) and a recessive RTR bit in the Arbitration Field identifies the message to be
a remote frame (23; 60).
3. Error Frame: The error frame involves two parts which are a 6-bit Error Flag
and an 8-bit Error Delimiter. When a node receives an error message, the Error Flag
and Error Delimiter are sent. In case of any inaccuracy, the error flag will be raised.
The Error Frame is shown in Fig. 2.5 (23).
4. Overload Frame: The Overload Frame is transmitted whenever the receiving
node is extremely busy and cannot receive the message and a delay between the
sent messages is activated. There are two conditions upon which an Overload flag is
transmitted. The first condition is the internal condition of the receiver, which causes
further latency in transmitting the next or remote frame or data frame (62). The
second condition for transmitting the Overload frame is the detection of a dominant
bit during the intermission. In addition, the Overload Frame contains a 6-bit Overload
flag and an 8-bit Overload Delimiter. Fig. 2.6 (23) shows the layout of the Overload
Frame.
5. Bit Stuffing Method: The bit stuffing rule is violated when six identical bits
are sent consecutively via CAN bus, which indicates an error (62). Therefore, a
complementary bit is added after transmitting five identical bits consecutively to
some fields in CAN bus to avoid bit stuffing such as Arbitration Field, Control Field,
and CRC Field (23). If bit stuffing occurs during transmission, then every node will
transmit the error frame as an indication of violation of bit stuffing law. Fig. 2.7 (23)
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shows how the bit stuffing is added to fields.
Figure 2.4: Remote frame of CAN
Figure 2.5: Error frame of CAN
Figure 2.6: Overload frame of CAN
Figure 2.7: Frame bit stuffing of CAN
2.2 FlexRay- an Overview
In 2000, FlexRay Consortium introduced the FlexRay protocol especially for safety
purposes in the automotive production, which requires a higher data rate. Therefore,
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FlexRay technology can be considered safer and more advanced than CAN and LIN
technologies. The most significant feature of FlexRay, that CAN and LIN busses lack,
is network versatility by which FlexRay protocol adopts various topologies such as
star, bus, and Hybrid topology (63). Like the functionality of HUB topology in the
Ethernet network, the star topology is described as a central node that is connected
to other nodes to expand the network and cover longer distances. The other benefit
of the star topology is that a partial breakdown of the network will not affect the
functionality of the entire network (23; 64). Star topology might be exposed to the
ambient noise that could be caused by long distance wiring. To eliminate most of the
noise and to increase the purity of the network, the star topology adopts the multiple
legs concept instead of the one leg star topology (23). On the other hand, FlexRay
can combine both the bus and the star topologies together as a hybrid system. Using
the bus and the star topologies in parallel sounds more promising in the future of
intra-vehicle networks due to high fault-tolerance and reliability of the star topology,
despite the affordability and simplicity of use for the bus topology (23). In Fig. 2.8
(23), a basic diagram illustrates the hybrid topology of FlexRay. FlexRay supports
event-triggered and time-triggered tactics for the in-vehicle communication network.
The deterministic data reaches its destination in an expected time frame with the
support of time-triggered protocol, making this type of network is suitable for hard
real-time embedded systems (23).
FlexRay handles data collision by the mechanism of Time Division Multiple
Access TDMA (23). The nodes in the FlexRay network connect to the network-
synchronization clock, and by using TDMA the deterministic conditions are met and
the consistency of the data is ensured. In other words, each node will write to the
bus in periodic order due to the clock synchronization network that is supported by
FlexRay protocol (23; 63). FlexRay offers robustness with its two-wire or four-wire
differential signalling, the latter of which contains two separate twisted pairs tasked
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with transmitting the same information. Comparison of the signals received from each
twisted pair aids in determining the level of fidelity in the received data. The com-
munication cycle is comprised of four frames which are the Static Segment, Dynamic
Segment, Symbol Windows, and Network Idle Time.
1. Static Segment: The Static Segment of transmission supports deterministic
data, ensuring that certain data reaches its destination in a set period of time.
2. Dynamic Segment: The Dynamic Segment acts as the data frame in the CAN
network for messages that necessitate an event-triggered protocol, in which data de-
terminism approach is not required.
3. Symbol Windows: The Symbol Windows section is used for network mainte-
nance (23).
4. Network Idle Time: The Network Time Idle, known as “silent time”, preserves
clock synchronization in the network (23). The ECUs use this frame to regulate any
drift that might affect the network timing from the previous cycle. The FlexRay
hybrid topology is depicted in Fig. 2.8 (23).
Figure 2.8: FlexRay hybrid topology
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2.3 LIN- an Overview
One common protocol in modern vehicles is the Local Interconnect Network, oth-
erwise referred to as LIN. A LIN bus generally connects non-critical systems that do
not require direct connection to the CAN (Controller Area Network) bus, which helps
to oﬄoad bus traffic from the CAN bus or reduce the total number of CAN buses
required in a vehicle (65). Typical non-critical vehicle systems which use LIN include
seating systems, the windshield wiper system, lighting systems on the interior of the
vehicle, temperature control systems, and door modules (66). None of these applica-
tions require high reliability or robustness, so these systems do not require the high
reliability and performance provided by CAN. The LIN protocol uses a master-slave
configuration, with only one master and up to 16 slaves on each LIN bus (61; 66). The
master is responsible for controlling the data transfer cycle among all devices on the
LIN bus. LIN is schedule-based, or deterministic, and thus requests are made by the
master in a predetermined order. This schedule of requests makes it possible to know
exactly when a specific request will be sent. The master sends a request for specific
data by sending what is called a header, which is broadcast to the LIN bus. Each
slave is designated to respond only to a specific set of protected identifiers, which are
part of each header transmitted by the master (65; 66). When responding to a pro-
tected identifier, a device will publish data to the LIN bus. Note that only one node
is assigned to respond to any given message, so no two slaves should ever simultane-
ously send a response. Although only one node may respond by transmitting to the
LIN bus, other nodes may listen to the response and read the data being transmitted
(65). This scheduling system mandates that systems wait their turn to share data,
and no single system’s transmission is valued more highly than another. Another
consequence of scheduling is that the maximum latency between a slave becoming
ready to transmit data and its actual turn to broadcast data can be determined using
the schedule (66). The LIN bus is comprised of a single wire, and the master and
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slave devices can be daisy-chained along this bus. The bus is pulled up to a logical
high level, and when a LIN transmitter wants to send a dominant bit, it drives the
bus to zero volts by providing a connection to ground. A low bit is considered to
be dominant because only one node has to provide a connection to ground for the
bus to become low. Generally, the high voltage level will be equivalent to that of the
car battery in vehicles, or roughly twelve volts, for recessive bits. Again, zero volts
are measured for dominant bits. Note that these are ideal values; in reality, these
voltages can shift up or down by as much as ten percent of the battery voltage (66).
In LIN communication, there are two main components of a single communication
cycle: a header, also called a token or a request, and data. Only the master may send
a header.
1. Header: The first part of a transmission sequence is the header. This be-
gins with a break, which contains 13 consecutive dominant bits and ends with one
delimiting bit, which is recessive. In LIN, dominant bits have 0 volts, while reces-
sive bits typically assume a value between 9 and 18 volts (65), although there are
some exceptions. This break field indicates to the slaves that transmission is going
to begin. Next, there is a sync period. In LIN’s master-slave configuration, only
the master is required to possess a crystal oscillator, whereas slave nodes may use
much less accurate oscillators such as low-cost RC circuits. Because slave devices use
these cheaper, less accurate oscillators, the sync period is necessary so slave devices
can determine the baud rate of the master and match that rate. The sync period
consists of a dominant start bit, then 8 consecutive alternating bits (0x55) and lastly
a recessive stop bit. In essence, this signal is equivalent to transmitting the master’s
clock signal. Lastly, the protected identifier is sent. This consists of one dominant
start bit, a six-bit identification number for the specific task requested by the master,
two parity bits, and one stop bit (65). It should be noted that in LIN 2.0 the two
most significant bits of the protected ID, or bits four and five of the header byte, are
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used to indicate the length of the expected data transmitted in response, which can
be two, four, or eight bytes long (61).
2. Data: The data sent in response to a specific protected identifier may contain
either two, four, or eight frames. Each frame begins with a dominant start bit, then
contains one byte of data, and terminates with a stop bit. Between each start and
stop bit, each byte of data begins with the least-significant bit and concludes with the
most-significant bit (66). After the data bytes are sent, a one-byte checksum is sent,
also beginning with a start bit and ending with a stop bit. A checksum is calculated
by the slave and then transmitted. This transmitted checksum should match the
checksum calculated by the master. If checksums do not match, this indicates an
erroneous data transmission (61).
3. Parity: One check for message fidelity occurs during the transmission of a
header. Each header frame sends a dominant start bit, the six-bit protected identifier,
two parity bits, and a stop bit (65). The parity bits are computed by perform a
specified operation on the protected identifier in the header. The identifier bits and
the parity bits as a whole should follow an accepted rule when transmitted. If this
rule is violated in the received message then it is known that the transmitted message
was altered and corrupted. For LIN 2.0, the first bit is calculated by taking the
logical XOR operation of bits 0, 1, 2, and 4 of the protected identifier. The resulting
parity bit, P0, will be equal to one if the number of ones in these four bits is an
odd number, and zero otherwise. The second parity bit, P1, is the result of the
logical XOR operation with bits 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the protected identifier. P1 will be
one if the number of ones in these four bits is an odd number, and P1 will be zero
otherwise. If one of the protected identifier bits is corrupted during transmission, the
reproduction of these parity bits will yield different results than those transmitted,
indicating transmission failure (67).
4. Checksum: Another fidelity check occurs after all data frames are transmitted
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in a response, ensuring valid transmission of data. A checksum is transmitted, which
is the output of an algorithm that produces a one-byte result in this case. The
checksum is calculated by the transmitting device and is broadcast on the LIN bus
after transmitting all of its data. The recipient of the data then runs the same
checksum algorithm on all received data bytes, and compares its own output to the
checksum transmitted on the bus to determine if the data sent was truly error-free.
Older LIN protocols calculated a checksum by summing only the data bytes that were
transmitted, but LIN 2.0 also incorporates the protected identifier sent by the master
in the header into this computation (68).
2.4 Comparison of CAN, FlexRay and LIN Protocol
2.4.1 CAN vs. FlexRay
The CAN bus offers a robust, simple and affordable solution for the in-vehicle
network where the ECUs are all connected with each other and with a bus. This
architecture avoids complicated bi-directional communication, and the number of
wires required is just two. On the other hand, FlexRay is another well-structured basic
in-vehicle network system that promises a higher speed of transmission than the CAN
bus can support. One of the most significant features of the FlexRay that services
the automotive industry is providing higher rate data (10 Mbps) than CAN and LIN
communication (1 Mbps) (23), which expands the bandwidth for data transmission.
As a multi-master network, the CAN bus broadcast communication mechanism allows
transmission of the messages with higher priority first, which makes it suitable for
hard real-time systems (62). However, FlexRay is suitable for deterministic data
communication that prevents prioritization of messages in all situations (23). This
deterministic communication is given to vehicle dynamic controls and chassis (51).
Regarding reliability, the CAN system supports error detection techniques in-
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cluding Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) which allows all nodes in the bus to detect
and avoid messages that carry errors (23). Meanwhile, FlexRay offers redundant
communication capability (dual-channel communication) (23), which makes FlexRay
technology more secure than LIN and CAN networks, which totally lack this feature.
Another significant feature of FlexRay is network versatility: FlexRay supports star,
bus, and hybrid topologies, which are not supported by the CAN protocol (23; 64).
The maximum bus length for 1Mbit/s CAN protocol is 40-meters, while FlexRay al-
lows at most 24-meter bus length. CAN bus cable is made of two wires, while FlexRay
requests two to four wires. Fault-tolerance in FlexRay is ideal in-vehicle applications
like braking and steering control systems (51). The CAN bus is an event-triggered
protocol (23), whereas FlexRay is both a time-trigger and an event-trigger protocol
and it has the tolerance to event-triggered and time-triggered data in the same cycle
(51). Furthermore, the message transmitted via FlexRay can be both synchronous
and asynchronous, which satisfies the requirements for vehicle components that de-
pend on hard real-time systems such as an anti-lock braking system, or ABS, brake
control, and engine control (23). In the CAN protocol, the transmitted messages are
only asynchronous.
Both methods have several disadvantages. Although the broadcasting nature of
transmitting messages via CAN bus offers simplicity, the standard CAN bus sys-
tem commonly used in the automotive industry today lacks a message authentication
technique for both the source and the destination. This might increase the chance of
hackers to break through the system, send malicious messages and then fully attack
the system, where the receiver cannot realize if it is the original or a spoof message
(23). In the CAN protocol, data collision and collapse would be very possible when-
ever two nodes try to transmit data via the same bus at the same instance, so an
arbitration method is used to avoid the data collision since it is relatively easy to
apply and implement. However, this method is not practical for high rate data trans-
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Table 2.1: CAN vs. FlexRay
Comparison Criteria CAN FlexRay
Applications Safety-Critical Systems Safety-Critical Systems
Configuration Multiple-Master Multiple-Master
Cost and Complexity Relatively High Very High
Transmission Speed 1 Mbit/s 10 Mbit/s
Signalling Method 2-Wire Twisted Pair Differen-
tial Signalling
2-Wire/Four-Wire Twisted
Pair Differential Signalling
Number of ID Bits 11 or 29 11
Failure Management If Node Fails, That Node
Stops Transmitting
Topology Dependent; In Star
Topology, Failing Node is
Suppressed
Transmission Process Priority-Based and Event-
Driven
Time/Schedule-Based and
Priority Based/Event Driven
Topology Two-Wire Bus Two-Wire Bus or Star
Error-Checking 15-Bit CRC, Acknowledge-
ment Bit
24-Bit CRC and 16-Bit
Header CRC(68)
mission (23). However, FlexRay has disadvantages as well, such as implementation
cost, and difficulty of the protocol relative to the CAN protocol. Also, transmitting
time-triggered and event-triggered data can impact the efficiency of data transmission
(51). Table 2.1 summarizes the comparison of these protocols.
2.4.2 LIN vs. CAN
Because of the master-slave configuration, LIN slaves are not required to have
their own crystal oscillators, but rather can have cheaper RC oscillator circuits with
a tolerance of 15%. This is the most important factor in what makes LIN a low-cost
communication protocol in comparison to other protocols like CAN (66). Further-
more, the LIN bus only requires a single wire as opposed to the shielded twisted pair
wire required for CAN, which makes LIN more cost effective (61). The single-master
configuration of LIN is considered to be relatively simple to implement compared to
CAN, which uses a multiple-master architecture (65).
Due to the transmit-by-schedule nature of LIN, it does not support priority-based
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transmission, whereas CAN communication will serve nodes with high priority first
as they become ready to broadcast data. However, this means that LIN allows for
deterministic communication through scheduling, allowing one to know precisely when
a specific message will be sent. This is unlike CAN, in which one can approximately
predict when a node will transmit data based on its frequency of transmissions, but
this cycle will be irregular due to bus arbitration (68).
LIN has low transmission speed in the range of 1 to approximately 20 kbit/s,
which is slower than typical CAN transmission rates, which reach up to 1 Mbit/s.
Due to LIN’s scheduling nature, when a transmission error is detected, the schedule
continues as planned. However, in CAN, if an error is detected in a transmission, the
same message will be re-transmitted the next time the bus is available (68).
Both LIN and CAN combat electromagnetic interference (EMI) in different ways.
LIN has reasonable immunity to EMI due to its low transmission speeds, whereas
CAN uses a much higher transmission speed. Low speeds also prevent excessive
EMI radiation from the LIN bus. Unlike LIN, however, CAN combat EMI by using
differential signaling, which works well because both CAN line likely receive the same
disturbances from EMI, so the potential difference between the two lines theoretically
remains unaffected. CAN also use a twisted pair and shielding to increase immunity
and decrease radiation of EMI (61). Another reliability issue with LIN is that when
the master fails all systems connected to the bus fail, due to the master orchestrating
all communication (65). In CAN, this is not a problem because it uses a multiple-
master topology. When one CAN node has generated too many transmission errors,
the node will shut itself down (69).
Lastly, CAN is able to accommodate more systems and/or more unique messages
on a single bus. LIN’s protected identifiers are only six bits long, providing a total of
64 different identifiers that can be transmitted by the master. CAN networks either
use 11 bits or 29 bits, enabling a much larger variety of unique IDs to be transmitted
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Table 2.2: LIN vs.CAN
Comparison Criteria LIN CAN
Applications Lower-Performance Systems Safety-Critical Systems
Configuration Single-Master, Slaves Multiple-Master
Cost and Complexity Low Relatively High
Transmission Speed 20 kbit/s 1 Mbit/s
Signalling Method Single Line Signalling 2-Wire Twisted Pair Differen-
tial Signalling
Number of ID Bits 6 11 or 29
Failure Management If Master Fails, Whole LIN
Bus Fails
If Node Fails, That Node
Stops Transmitting
Transmission Process Time/Schedule-Based Priority-Based and Event-
Driven
Topology Single-Wire Bus Two-Wire Bus
Error-Checking 1-Byte Checksum 15-Bit CRC, Acknowledge-
ment Bit(68)
(61; 49). The main differences between LIN and CAN are summarized in Table 2.2.
2.4.3 LIN vs. FlexRay
Again, LIN’s single-master configuration demands that only the master has a
highly-accurate crystal oscillator, which makes this configuration relatively cheap,
as opposed to FlexRay, which does not use a single master-slave configuration and
requires high accuracy in all nodes’ oscillators. LIN communication is all schedule-
based, whereas FlexRay allows for both schedule-based and event-driven communi-
cation by allocating time slots for both static and dynamic frames (70).
The bandwidth of LIN is much lower than that of FlexRay; LIN’s 20 kbit/s
bandwidth is much smaller than FlexRay’s 10 Mbit/s bandwidth (68). Furthermore,
data transmission sizes are very different. A LIN message can transmit two, four,
or eight bytes onto the LIN bus in response to a request from the master, while a
FlexRay node may transmit up to 254 bytes of data in one data frame (70).
The FlexRay star topology allows for higher reliability than LIN communication in
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Table 2.3: LIN vs. FlexRay
Comparison Criteria LIN FlexRay
Applications Lower-Performance Systems Safety-Critical Systems
Configuration Single-Master, Slaves Multiple-Master
Cost and Complexity Low Very High
Transmission Speed 20 kbit/s 10 Mbit/s
Signalling Method Single Line Signalling Two-Wire/Four-Wire
Twisted Pair Differential
Signalling
Number of ID Bits 6 11
Failure Management If Master Fails, Whole LIN
Bus Fails
Topology-Dependent; In Star
Topology, Failing Node is
Suppressed
Transmission Process Time/Schedule-Based Time/Schedule-Based and
Priority-Based/Event-Driven
Topology Single-Wire Bus Two-Wire Bus or Star
Error-Checking 1-Byte Checksum 24-Bit CRC and 16-Bit
Header CRC(70)
the sense that it gives the ability to disconnect nodes experiencing failure, preventing
these faulty messages from transmitting to all other nodes (71). LIN uses only a
single wireline while FlexRay generally uses two-wire differential signaling. FlexRay
also offers a redundant four-wire protocol, where one transmitted message is sent over
two buses. The received messages from each bus can then be compared to ensure that
they are identical and no corruption has occurred. This kind of security feature is
used only for systems that are safety-critical (70). Also, because in FlexRay up to
254 bytes of data can be transmitted by one node, compared to a maximum of 8
data bytes in LIN, FlexRay uses three 8-bit CRCs (a common type of checksum) as
opposed to LIN’s single byte checksum (70). The main comparisons between LIN and
FlexRay are shown in Table 2.3.
In this chapter, CAN, FlexRay, and LIN technologies are discussed and com-
pared to each other to provide an idea of how the combined interconnected systems
of automobiles work together proficiently to prevent critical issues with transmitting
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messages. A comparison is made to demonstrate the differences, topologies and spec-
ifications of each protocol and as a complete interconnected communication system
in each vehicle. In general, the number of ID bits for CAN is 11 or 29, which gives it
more flexibility in data transmission with different IDs (61; 49). FlexRay is 11 bits,
and LIN is 6 bits. The comparison of CAN, FlexRay and LIN shows that the systems
are well structured and suitable for signal transmission in a real-time driven fashion.
However, FlexRay has a higher speed in transmitting signals due to its hybrid nature
of time-triggered and event-triggered approaches, which gives it higher bandwidth
than CAN and LIN. FlexRay is considered safer than CAN and LIN due to higher
data rate requirements. Error detection methods differ among discussed protocols.
FlexRay offers redundant communication capability while CAN and LIN offer cyclic
redundancy code (CRC). Unlike FlexRay and LIN, CAN priorities signal transmis-
sion due to the bus arbitration mechanism. However, FlexRay and LIN do not allow
message arbitration due to the deterministic nature of their data communication. LIN
is more cost-effective compared to CAN and FlexRay because it does not require a
high-accuracy crystal oscillator. Instead, it only needs low-cost RC oscillator circuits
in slave devices for performance. In terms of applications, CAN and FlexRay are used
for safety-critical systems while LIN is more suitable for low-performance applications
that are not time-critical such as window lift, wipers and mirrors.
CAN and FlexRay are multiple-Master communication models, yet LIN is a Single-
Master Multi-Slave model. This configuration makes LIN cheaper than CAN and
FlexRay, which are more expensive due to higher accuracy needed in all node os-
cillators. However, the entire LIN bus fails if the Master fails. In CAN bus, the
failure mode is restrained by node failure where the transmission stops. On the other
hand, FlexRay failure management is topology dependent. Moreover, the transmis-
sion speed of FlexRay is the fastest, which is 20 Mbit/s, CAN is 1 Mbit/s, and lastly,
the transmission speed of LIN is 20 Kbit/s. The signaling method of CAN is based
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on two twisted-pair wiring, FlexRay is based on two or four twisted-pair wiring. Nev-
ertheless, LIN is based on single-line signaling. This makes LIN more available to
be used in a wide range of vehicles for a low price. Eventually, a comparative study
was carefully implemented on three essential and contemporary communication meth-
ods for in-vehicle networking. It shows the importance and specialty of each system
individually, and then in one whole system collectively.
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CHAPTER III
Related Work
In 2015, Miller et. al. (50) hijacked a jeep in the middle of the highway, which led
to a recall of 1.4 million vehicles. They were able to control the main functions of the
vehicle like engine and brakes etc., hence making a case to improve security in modern
electric vehicles for the safety of passengers. The existing state Of-the-art (SOA) on
countermeasure against spoofing and impersonation attacks on in-vehicle networks
can be divided into (i) message authentication based approaches (19; 18; 20; 21; 22;
23; 24), (ii) intrusion detection based approaches (29; 30; 31; 32; 33; 34; 35; 36; 37;
38; 39; 40; 41; 44; 25; 59; 45; 43; 26; 46; 27; 42) as shown in Fig. 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Existing SOA approaches for IVN attacks
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Most of the work done for in-vehicle network security relies on the message au-
thentication code (MAC) - a traditional computer network security framework. In
(17), Wang et. al. proposed a framework for security in-vehicle systems (VeCure)
which relies on the message authentication code (MAC) for secure communication.
In VeCure, the transmitting node sends a 64-bits of MAC for every 64-bit message.
This method has high computational cost considering the computational capacity of
the ECU and 50% additional transmission overhead. Hiroshi et. al. designed an
authentication mechanism for the CAN protocol against spoofing attacks. The moni-
toring node provided the authentication code for all ECUs and verified the code for all
CAN messages. Hazem et. al. proposed a lightweight CAN authentication protocol
(LCAP). The LCAP required to append a “magic number” that was generated by a
one-way hash function employed on TESLA prototype (47). The protocol required
16-bits of the data field to append the authentication code, which still creates 25%
overhead. MAC-based approaches work well, however, they have 4 major limitations.
First, the MAC-based approaches typically add extra overhead in the network because
more bits are required for encryption. The second limitation is that the MAC-based
approach typically needs a higher data rate. The third limitation is that if the en-
cryption key is estimated by the adversary, it can easily make an attack. The fourth
limitation is that additional hardware is required for the MAC-based approach; this
adds extra cost to the system. Moreover, due to the centralized monitoring node, the
whole network will become compromised if this node is eliminated/compromised.
To overcome the shortcomings of MAC based approaches, the intrusion detection
system (IDS) based approaches are used. Intrusion detection based approaches are
further subdivided into: (a) parameter monitoring based approaches (29; 30; 31),
(b) information theory based approaches (32; 33; 34), (c) machine learning based
approaches (35; 36; 37; 38; 39; 40; 41), and (d) fingerprinting based approaches
(44; 25; 45; 43; 26; 46; 27; 42) as shown in Fig. 3.2. The intrusion detection sys-
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tems (IDSs) are being used persistently in computer network for many years (72).
Cybersecurity professionals for automotive security have also started using IDSs for
protecting connected vehicles against cyberattacks (27).
Figure 3.2: Intrusion detection based approaches
3.1 Parametric Monitoring based IDS
The 1st type of IDS is based on parameter monitoring. Parametric monitoring
based approaches can be subdivided into (a1) frequency-based technique and (a2)
remote frame-based technique (73). In frequency-based technique, the frequency/pe-
riodicity of message frames is monitored (30). In this technique, transmission intervals
of CAN messages can be detected and compared against the established baseline (74).
Researchers have shown that during spoofing attacks and denial of service (DoS) at-
tacks, the frequency of the message frames is changed (31; 50; 73). There are-two
limitations of the frequency-based technique, the first limitation is that it works only
for periodic messages, the second limitation is that if the adversary has knowledge of
the period, it can launch a spoofing attack. The second type of parametric monitor-
ing based approach is the remote frame-based technique. Whenever a node in CAN
32
receives a remote frame, it responds to the sender with a message within a certain
amount of time. Offset in this response time can reflect a suspicious activity (29).
There are-two limitations of this technique, the first limitation is that it requires an
additional node, the second limitation is that if the adversary has knowledge of the
response time, it can launch a spoofing attack.
3.2 Information Theory-based IDS
The 2nd type of IDS is information theory-based. The internal communication of
an ECU is in order (73). The set of sequences in which different subroutines/functions
are called during a certain task are stored and if the sequence is violated during a task,
it indicates the occurrence of an attack. For instance, Wang et. al. collected 6.673
million CAN packets for different vehicles (75), their experimental results showed
that CAN message have low entropy of an average of 11.915 bits (75). The idea of
entropy-based attack detection was first introduced by Muter et. al., the issue with
this type of approach is that if an adversary injects a small number of malicious
messages, the attack is difficult to be recognized (76). In another study, Marchetti
et. al. showed that if an attacker launches an attack in the vehicular network, an
entropy-based attack detector is able to detect the attack only if the attack is made
in a high volume of forged CAN messages (32).
3.3 Machine Learning-based IDS
The 3rd type of IDS is the machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI)
based approach. ML and AI-based classification, regression and clustering are used
to provide to implement security in vehicular networks at different levels (73). For
instance, Taylor et. al. proposed a Long ShortTerm Memory (LSTM) neural network
to detect CAN bus attacks (35). Typically nodes in CAN protocol do not produce a
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variety of data. In this method, the recurrent neural network (RNN) for CAN bus
anomaly detection were used. Further, it required the neural network to be trained
for each node. Another ML-based algorithm for in-vehicle security Ternary Content
Addressable Memory (TCAM) was introduced by Markowitz et. al. (37), TCAM is
a special type of high-speed memory usually used by modern switches and routers
for fast look-up tables and packet classification. In its training phase, this system
used the classifier to characterize the fields and build a model for the messages, based
on their field types. In the testing phase, the system detected deviations from the
model (37). Kang et. al. proposed a deep learning-based ML technique (36). Deep
learning is a machine learning technique that used a number of hierarchical layers of
non-linear processing stages. The 64-bit data field of valid CAN messages was used
as an input in the deep neural network. In the validation phase, the output of the
deep learning-based model is ’1’ or ’0’. Here, ’1’ refers to a normal CAN packet and
’0’ refers to an anomaly/attack. ML-based approaches are typically used to prevent
attacks at the application layer. ML-based models work well, however, they require
considerable computing and storage resources.
3.4 Fingerprinting-based IDS
The 4th type of IDS is the fingerprint-based approach. The idea of fingerprinting
the source from physical signal is not only used for fingerprinting ECUs, but is also
used for fingerprinting other electronic devices such as microphones (77; 78). This
approach is used to avoid attacks at the physical layer. In this type, the inimitable
characteristics in physical signal are used to identify the legitimate transmitter. In
(26), Cho and Shin proposed a clock based intrusion detection system (CIDS) which
used an approach of ECU fingerprinting. This system used deviation from the basic
characteristics of the clock based digital systems, that is, “the tiny timing error known
as clock skew.” For identification of an ECU, the clock skew and clock offset are
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primarily used. Thus, the proposed system identification deviates from the basic
clock-based ECU. Cho and Shin (26) conjointly made a paradigm of planned IDS
and showed the incontestable efficiency of planned CIDS in real automobiles. CIDS
leveraged the fact that the clock skew is a physical property of each ECU that cannot
be changed by the adversary (26). However, Tayyab et. al. (49) and Sang et. al.
(28) demonstrated that CIDS can be bypassed by estimating the clock parameters.
In (46), higher-order moments of CAN signal both in time- and frequency-domain
are used for transmitter identification. It has been demonstrated that the method
demonstrated in (46) achieved detection accuracy of 98.3%. Another prominent work
in IDS is done by Sang et. al. (28) in which the authors demonstrated “cloaking
attack”, in which an adversary modified the timing of transmitted messages in order
to match the clock skew of a targeted ECU, hence bypassing the security of the
system. They (28) showed a new IDS that is developed based on the widely-used
Network Time Protocol (NTP). This IDS used two parameters, clock skewness and
cumulative sum, to identify the transmitting ECU for message authentication.
3.4.1 Scission
Kneib and Huth proposed a method ’Scission’ to implement security in CAN.
Scission uses a sampling rate of 20Msamples/sec. After sampling the signal from
each ECU, the statistical features of the signal from each transmitter are calculated
in addition to energy of the signal. These features proved to be unique for each
transmitter because of variations in supply voltages, variations in grounding, varia-
tions in resistors, termination and cables, and imperfections in bus topology causing
reflections. This feature-set is used to link the message to the source ECU to authen-
ticate the message (45). Scission detected the valid message with a 99.85% accuracy
(45). The feature-set is shown in Table 3.1. Viden uses only acknowledgement bits
to identify the transmitter. The advantage of Scission is that it can prevent attacks
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using any part of the frame. The strength of a signal is determined by energy, which
is expressed by eq. (3.1).
Energy =
1
N
N∑
i=1
x(i)2 (3.1)
Table 3.1: Time domain feature-set
Feature
Name
Equation
Maximum mij = (Min(yij(i))|i = 1....N)
Minimum Mij = (Max(yij(i))|i = 1....N)
Mean µij = 1/N
∑N
i=1 yij(i)
Variance σ2ij =
√
(1/N − 1)(∑Ni=1 yij(i)− µij)
Skewness ρij = (1/N)
∑N
i=1((yij(i)− µij)/ρij)3
Kurtosis kij = (1/N)
∑N
i=1((yij(i)− µij)/ρij)4 − 3
3.4.2 Using Inimitable Characteristics of Signals
In (26), Choi et al. used inimitable characteristics of signals using unique signa-
tures from each ECU fingerprinting (26). This method adds a monitoring unit to
the CAN-protocol, in which messages are functionality-based. This monitoring unit
supervised the messages transmitted by ECU and ensured that it sent only the au-
thentic messages (26). If an ECU is supposed to control the sensors of the car, it
should not send messages to the engine. If the ECU does send messages to the engine,
then the system alarms of an attack (26). The monitoring unit used a sampling rate
of 2.5Gsamples/sec. After sampling the signal from each ECU, this method used
moment generating functions of signals in time domain as well as frequency domain
as a feature-set. Further, transmitters are classified for message authentication by
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Table 3.2: Frequency domain feature-set
Feature
Name
Equation
Spectral
Std-Dev
σs =
√
(
∑N
i=1(yf (i))
2 ∗ (ym(i)))/
∑N
i=1(ym(i))
Spectral
Skewness
ρs =
∑N
i=1 yf (i)ym(i)/σ
3
s
Kurtosis
Std-Dev
ks = (
∑N
i=1(ym(i)− Cs)4 ∗ ym(i))/σ4s − 3
Spectral
Centroid
Cs = (
∑N
i=1 yf (i)ym(i))/(
∑N
i=1 ym(i))
Irregularity
K
IKs =
∑N−1
i=2 |ym(i)− (ym(i− 1) + ym(i) + ym(i+ 1))/3|
“supervised learning”. The feature-set used was the same as in Scission as seen in
Table 3.1. In addition, the method used frequency domain features as shown in Table
3.2. This method detected the ECU with 96.48% accuracy (26). Table 3.3 shows the
differences between each method.
3.4.3 VoltageIDS
Choi et al. used VoltageIDS (44) for security measures against masquerade
attacks from an outside source. The signal was acquired at a sampling rate of
2.5Gsamples/sec at the monitoring unit. After acquiring the signal. some addi-
tional features in addition to the features used in (26) were used both in time domain
as well as in frequency domain. This technique is done by “supervised learning”
(44). Supervised learning is done in two steps: a training step and testing step. The
training step creates a multi-class classifier, which has the classes and ECUs equal in
number (44). This step uses the sets created in the multi-class classifier and labels
them with CAN IDs (44). During the testing step, the VoltageIDS detects a mas-
querade attack if the multi-class classifier has predictions of probable classes that do
not match the CAN ID (44). Since this method used frequent learning, the system
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is an easy target for injection attacks, meaning it can adapt to the attacking mes-
sages (44). Fig. 3.3 shows the multiple steps VoltageIDS uses to make sure there
are no irregularities/invaders in the system. This method has a transmitter detection
accuracy of 93.54% on real vehicle.
Figure 3.3: VoltageIDS steps
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Table 3.3: Comparison of fingerprinting methods
Research
Work
Method Contribution Accuracy Advantages Disadvantages
Kneib
et. al.
(45)
Scission
It allows the
localization
of the
transmitter
which is
ECU.
99.85%
Localizes the
location of
the attack.
Addition of
an extra ECU
is needed.
Adds cost.
Choi et.
al. (43)
Using
Inim-
itable
Charac-
teristics
of Signals
Identifies
inimitable
ECUs
96.48%
No change in
the ECU
system is
needed.
Requires
installing an
extra unit.
Choi et.
al. (44)
Voltage
IDS
Distinguishes
between
errors and
the bus-off
attacks.
93.54%
Addresses the
attack
properly.
Extra unit
needed.
Cho et.
al. (26)
CIDS
The ECU
identification
is
independent
of voltage
characteris-
tics.
99.95%
Cannot be
bypassed by
burning chip.
Does not
identify the
location of
the attacker.
Cho et.
al. (25)
Viden
Fingerprinting
of ECUs
based upon
voltage-based
signatures.
99.8%
Identities the
ECU.
Burning out
the signature
detection
ECU by high
voltage will
allow the
attacker to
invade the
system.
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3.4.4 Clock based Intrusion Detection System (CIDS)
The CIDS (26) exploits uniqueness in the clock parameters, such as clock offset
and clock skew for CAN node fingerprinting. Previously, various researchers have used
this concept for wireless access point fingerprinting (79; 80) and wired Ethernet device
fingerprinting (81). These researchers (79; 80; 81) rely on the presence of time-stamp
in the packet headers. The absence of time-stamp field in the CAN protocol makes
it unfit for direct extension of clock-based intrusion detection systems (79; 80; 81).
Cho and Shin (26) proposed the methodology to extract the sender node’s clock
characteristics in CAN network to design an intrusion detection, which is discussed
in the subsequent sections.
Clock parameters: The clock parameters used for modelling the clock physical
attributes are defined below (26):
• Clock offset: The difference between the time reported by the clock Ci and
the true clock is called clock offset. The difference between the reported times
of non-true clocks is known as the relative offset.
• Clock frequency: The rate at which the clock Ci advances.
• Skew: It is the difference between the frequencies of the true clock and the
local clock Ci. The difference between the frequencies of two non-true clocks is
known as the relative skew.
The clock offset and clock skew of each node in an asynchronous network depends
solely upon the local clocks of the nodes. Estimates of these clock parameters can be
used for node fingerprinting. As discussed earlier, the estimation of these parameters
is easy to achieve in the presence of time-stamps inside the message packets, but the
absence of time-stamp information in embedded networks (e.g., CAN protocol) makes
it difficult to achieve it. The CIDS framework (26) estimates these parameters for
periodic messages. Before outlining the CIDS method to estimate the parameters,
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Table 3.4: Message IDs and the period
ID Period (ms) DLC
0xAA 50 3
0xBB 100 3
0xCC 150 3
0xDD 500 3
brief overview of my experimental setup and CAN network configuration is provided
next.
Experimental setup and implementation: To validate and implement the
CIDS, a CAN network is realized with four nodes. Shown in Fig. 3.4 is the snapshot
of my realization of CAN network. Each node here consists of an Arduino UNO board
as ECU and CAN Shield as the CAN transceiver. The node M (Monitoring Node)
in the network is used for monitoring the traffic and is running the CIDS. It listens
to the network traffic and computes clock parameters. These parameters are then
sent via serial link to the MATLAB for plotting the graphs and visually analyzing
the clock behaviors of the sender nodes. The remaining three nodes are labelled as
E3, E5 and E6.
The speed of the CAN bus is set to 500 Kbps. The CAN traffic consists of messages
of four different IDs at different time periods. The details of the contents of the CAN
network traffic are listed in Table 3.4. To analyze the behavior of clock parameters for
each node, each node (E3, E5 and E6) is used to transmit messages with four different
IDs in such a way that each node is sending unique messages from a particular ID at
any given time. This resulted in the following configurations {E3: 0xAA, E5: 0xBB,
E6:0xCC}, {E3: 0xBB, E5: 0xCC, E6:0xDD} or {E3: 0xCC, E5: 0xDD, E6:0xAA}.
Experimental data is collected for each configuration. The architecture of the CIDS
which is running on node M is explained below:
Parameter estimation and clock behavior modelling: In in-vehicle CAN,
most of the messages are periodic, and each node transmits messages with a specific
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Figure 3.4: Block diagram of the CAN realization used for experiments
ID. These properties are exploited to estimate the clock parameters (e.g. clock offset
and clock skew) of the message sender node.
Periodicity estimation: To estimate parameters of a node with a particular
message ID, the period of the message is estimated first (49). The estimated period
of a given message at node M node is a function of the sender node’s clock crystal.
Changing the message sender is expected to result in a slightly different value. This is
due to the fact that the CAN protocol is asynchronous. Thus, the timing calculations
at each node depends on the local clocks only.
Estimation of offset: Calculated time period is T from the previous step while
t is the continuous time at the receiver side (node M) measured by the local clock
of the receiver. Let the first message receives at t=t1 and the predicted arrival time
(with no offset) of the succeeding i messages ti=t1+iT. In case of two asynchronous
clocks, the expected arrival time with clock offset (Oi), subsequent messages’ arrival
time-stamps can be expressed as ti=t1+Oi+iT. To measure clock offset, predicted
arrival time-stamp is subtracted from the actual time-stamp. The change in clock
offset between two consecutive messages is negligible and expected to be close to zero.
Clock skew estimation: The average value of the clock offset is non-zero, but
the change of offset value between consecutive messages will be negligible. Therefore,
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to estimate the change in clock offset, the absolute average clock offset, computed for
N messages are added and tracked. The resulting cumulative clock offset, called the
CUMSUM, Oacc, is tracked for anomaly detection. The CUMSUM value is expected
to grow linearly. The slope of the CUMSUM represents the clock skew of the message
sender. The clock skew is unique and used for ECU fingerprinting.
Clock behavior modelling and intrusion detection: The linear behavior of
the CUMSUM is approximated using Recursive Least Square (RLS) algorithm (26).
The accumulative clock offset Oacc can be expressed as:
Oacc[k] = S[k] ∗ t[k] + e[k] (3.2)
where S[k] denotes the regression parameter and represents the clock skew, t[k] de-
notes the elapsed time and e[k] represents the identification error. The identification
error is also known as the residual error.
The Oacc, S and e are calculated for every N messages. Therefore, a total of k*N
messages are needed for parameter estimation at kth step. The value of S is computed
using RLS algorithm, while residual, e, is computed as:
e[k] = Oacc[k]− S[k − 1] ∗ t[k] (3.3)
As long as the messages are being sent by the original ECU, the S[k] is expected to
remain unchanged, resulting in residual e ≈ 0. This intrusion system is designed to
solve the problem of sender authentication absence in the CAN protocol and, hence,
is expected to detect the spoofing attacks. Whenever the source of a message is
changed, the clock behavior associated with that ID also changes, resulting in the
large value of the residual error that is tracked continuously.
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3.4.5 Viden
Cho et al. introduced a technique, ”voltage based attacker identification (Viden)”
(25), which used voltage outputs of the ECUs to fingerprint the system. Viden
is based on voltage profiles from different ECU outputs (25). It characterizes the
voltage profile in acknowledgement bits and uses voltage signatures coming from
each ECU at relative lower sampling rate of 50Ksamples/sec as compared to other
methods. If the voltage differs from the signatures of authentic ECU, it triggers an
alarm to report an attacker is in the system (25). Viden also localized the location of
adversary device from which the attack was launched, which most methods cannot do
(25). The results from Viden showed that it safeguarded vehicles from attackers with
a 99.8% accuracy rate. The voltage profile of ECU also changes with environmental
conditions like temperature, humidity, etc. The voltage profile also changes with other
conditions, including noise, electromagnetic interference. Viden uses adaptive signal
processing to adapt to different inside and outside conditions. The voltage profile was
characterized in each condition and then used to identify transmitting ECU with a
very high accuracy of 99.8%.
3.4.6 Implementing In-Vehicle Security Using Higher Order Statistics
Researchers have proposed various methods to link a CAN packet to its source by
using physical characteristics of signal. For instance Cho and Shin have proposed a
method clock intrusion detection system (CIDS) which uses clock skewness to iden-
tify the transmitter. CIDS works well, however it can be bypassed if the attacker has
knowledge of clock characteristics of sender and receiver. This research (46) proposed
a method to bypass CIDS, then it presents a new method by developing a framework
to link a CAN packet to its source. Physical signal attributes of the received packet
consisting of channel and node (or device) contains specific unique artifacts are used
to achieve this goal. Material and design imperfections in the physical channel and
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digital device are the main contributing factors behind the device and channel spe-
cific unique artifacts. Uniqueness of the channel-device specific attributes are also
investigated for time- and frequency-domain. Feature vector is made up of both time
and frequency domain physical attributes and then employed to train an artificial
neural network (ANN)-based classifier. Performance of the proposed fingerprinting
method was evaluated by using a dataset collected from six different channels and
four identical ECUs transmitting same message.
The contribution of this research was to propose a method to bypass clock in-
trusion detection system (CIDS), to present a novel non-crypto-based approach for
message authentication for the CAN protocol that exploits uniqueness in the channel
and device-specific distortions to link the received CAN packets to ‘the’ transmitting
ECU. The robustness of the proposed method in terms of channel-level as well as
device-level variability is evaluated using bench-testing. The transmitter identifica-
tion model that depends on the proved claim that any electronic device that has
various components like the micro-controller, DAC, clock etc.. like the ECU and the
impulse response of the CAN channel are unique in nature and thus these unique
artifacts and distinguishable statistical features can be extracted from the received
signal and were used to link them to its source ECU and identify the sender. The
variations from different channels were used for various feature extraction tools. The
uniqueness was evaluated both in time and frequency domain. The effectiveness of
method was validated using the feature extraction method proposed in (82). A 40-
Dimensional Scalar features in both time and spectral domain are extrapolated using
LibXtract. LibXtract is a library for feature extraction (83). It uses a FEAST tool-
box that works on the joint mutual information criterion to rank the feature. Using
this feature extraction 11-D feature vector for ECU and channel identification was
used for transmitter identification.
The main reason for the channel specific artifacts or ECU specific artifacts is
45
because of the material and design imperfections that are embedded into them at
various stages of its development. In the first part of this research, data was recorded
data for the 3 types of cable family with 6 different lengths each using same ECU.
The input message used was same for all the channel types and the ECU used to
generate this message is also same. The only variable for this experiment was channel
class and the length. As the neural network is first trained (training phase), in this
phase it is classified for three different cable families and six corresponding lengths
(e.g., GXL: 0.5 meter, GXL: 1 meter, GXL: 2 meter, GXL: 3 meter, GXL: 4 meter,
and GXL: 5 meter and so on). First the neural network is trained with multi-layer
”scaled conjugate gradient back propagation” training algorithm. In this 11 input
variables (both in frequency and time domain), 6 outputs to represent 6 different
channel lengths of GXL cable. The stopping criteria of Epochs=2000, gradient =
10−7, and 3 hidden layers with 50, 40, and 40 hidden nodes respectively. In the
second part of this research, channel was kept same and data was transmitted using 4
ECUs, 11 input variables (both in frequency and time domain), 4 outputs to represent
4 different ECUs. The stopping criteria of Epochs=2000, gradient = 10−7, and 3
hidden layers with 50, 40, and 40 hidden nodes respectively. With this set-up and
idea that was proposed, a correction rate of 95.2% and 98.3% for both CAN-Bus
channel identification and ECU identification was achieved respectively. The CAN-
Bus and the ECU are from the same manufacturer and are identical, it leaves an
inimitable artifacts in the output of the signal at the physical layer and the channel
output. These characteristic artifacts are different for varying channel lengths and
ECUs. Thus, this uniqueness was used to link the received physical signal to the
actual transmitter.
46
CHAPTER IV
Study of ECU Specific Distortion and ECU
Identification by Using Neural Networks
4.1 Introduction
A novel technique for electronic control unit (ECU) identification is proposed in
this chapter to address security vulnerabilities of the controller area network (CAN)
protocol. The reliable ECU-identification has the potential to prevent spoofing at-
tacks launched over the CAN due to the inconsideration of the message authentica-
tion. In this regard, my technique models the ECU-specific random distortion caused
by the imperfections in digital-to-analog converter, and semiconductor impurities in
the transmitting ECU for fingerprinting. Afterwards, a 4-layered double Neural net-
work architecture is trained on the feature-set to identify the transmitting ECU and
the corresponding ECU-pin. The ECU-pin identification is also a novel contribution
of this work, and can be used to avoid the voltage-based attacks. I have evaluated
my method over a dataset generated through 7 ECUs with 6 pins having 185 records
for each ECU and 40 records for each pin. The performance evaluation against state-
of-the-art methods revealed that the proposed method achieved 99.4% accuracy for
ECU-identification and 96.7% accuracy for pin-identification that signifies the relia-
bility of the proposed approach.
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Figure 4.1: Generalized architecture of CAN
This approach exploits the uniqueness in device-specific distortions e.g., semicon-
ductor impurities, DC offset, aliasing error, the mismatch between the nominal and
measured values of electric components in digital to analog converter (DAC), etc.,
for message fingerprint generation. This research hypothesizes that distortions due
to digital-to-analog conversion operation at the ECU output are device-dependent
that can be used to link the received packet to the transmitting ECU. Therefore, I
associate the received packet through a specific ECU, and the ECU-pin responsible
for message transmission through a double neural network approach.
4.1.1 Research Objectives
The main objective of this research is: (i) to investigate ECU-level uniqueness for
a given network and (ii) to investigate pin-level uniqueness for a given ECU to authen-
ticate the message. The proposed method relies on distinctive physical artifacts of
the DAC of the transmitting ECU for device-level fingerprinting. The imperfections
in material, design, fabrication of DAC are contributing factors that create distortion
in the ECU signal. I perform the statistical modeling of this distortion and use it as
a feature vector for transmitter identification (i.e. transmitting ECU, and ECU-Pin)
through neural network architecture. Thus, the main contributions of the chapter
are:
• I provide a mathematical model of the distortion sources i.e. imperfections in
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the material, design, fabrication of DAC.
• I propose a statistical model of the device (ECU)-level distortion for transmitter
identification.
• I also propose that different transmitting pins in a single device have unique
distortion and can be used for ECU-pin identification.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the system model, and
outlines sources of device-specific distortion in the CAN signal. Experimental setup,
dataset, performance measures, results, and analysis are provided in section 4.3, this
section also provides the comparison of my method with the current state of the art
research.
4.2 System Model
Fig. 4.1 shows a subnet in CAN that contains γ = {1, 2, . . . , n} ECUs represented
as E(i), with a fingerprinting unit E(s) that sniffs the transmission of analog signal
y
(a)
(i) (t) by the ECU E(i), where i ∈ γ. The E(s) converts the signal y(a)(i) (t) to a digital
signal y
(a)
(i) (n) with a sampling rate of 20Msa/sec. Afterwards, the E(s) computes the
expected signal y
(e)
(i) (n) that is used for distortion computation i.e. d(i)(n) for E(i),
such that {d(i)(n) ∈ n(i) | n(i) : [L→ U ]}, where L = −0.10 and U = 0.10 represent
the lower and upper distortion values respectively. The d(i)(n) is then used for feature
extraction to generate the feature vector x(r) = {x(1), x(2), . . . , x(m)} for E(i), where
m represents the number of features, r ∈ R and R is the total number of records.
The feature vector is then passed to a double neural network architecture, which is
pre-trained on R records for message authentication. Fig. 4.2 shows the architecture
of the proposed method and is described in detail in following subsections.
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Figure 4.2: Block diagram of transmitter identification system
4.2.1 Signal Acquisition
The E(s) acquires the analog signal y
(a)
(i) (t) generated by E(i) and converts this
signal into digital signal y
(a)
(i) (n) as represented in eq. (4.1).
y
(a)
(i) (n) = y
(a)
(i) (t)|t=nTs , Ts = 50× 10−9 (4.1)
The Ts = 50 × 10−9 represents sampling time of 50nsec and sampling rate of
20MSa/sec for the signal. The reason to generate y
(a)
(i) (n) is that the y
(a)
(i) (t) occurs
at infinite instants of time, thus demands large memory to get stored. However, as
the E(s) has limited memory, therefore, the analog-to-digital conversion is performed.
The number of bits required to store each sample are n, in my case, n = 8 bits. In
order to extract distortion, I compute the expected signal y
(e)
(i) (n) from y
(a)
(i) (n) using
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eq. (4.2):
y
(e)
(i) (n) =
 3.5v : 3.3 < y
(e)
(i) (n) < 3.7
2.5v : Otherwise
(4.2)
The signal y
(e)
(i) (n) is mapped to 3.5 v if y
(a)
(i) (n) is between 3.3 v and 3.7 v else will
be 2.5 v. The signal y
(e)
(i) (n) represents the ideal signal from E(i); however, it has been
observed through extensive analysis of CAN communication signals, that the actual
signal levels differ from the expected signal levels. As shown in Fig. 4.3, the waveform
of the CAN signal captured using a DS1012A oscilloscope for the y
(a)
(i) (n), significantly
differs from the expected signal y
(e)
(i) (n) due to the distortion mainly attributed to
semiconductor impurities, mismatch between nominal values and measured values
of electric components, aliasing error of finite impulse response (FIR) filter and DC
offset of DAC. Moreover, these imperfections are device-specific, hence, they can be
used for fingerprinting of the ECUs.
4.2.2 Distortion Extraction
The imperfections observed in the signal acquisition stage are used for finger-
printing the ECUs. The fingerprinting is quantified in the form of distortion modeling
which is acquired in Density Estimation stage. Before distortion modeling, I acquire
distortion as shown in Fig. 4.4, which is represented in eq. (4.3).
d(i)(n) = y
(a)
(i) (n)− y(e)(i) (n). (4.3)
There are four main reasons for distortions which are discussed as follows:
Mismatch of nominal and measured values of electric components:
Imperfections in the electric components are one of the sources of d(i)(n). These
imperfections can be described as a deviation of the measured values of electric com-
ponents from their nominal values. Let Ro(i) be the value of the feedback resistor of
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the E(i) and δR(i) represents the deviation from the nominal value, commonly known
as the tolerance level. The actual resistance Ra(i) can then be expressed as eq. (4.4)
which is as follows:
Ra(i) = Ro(i) + δR(i) . (4.4)
Let d
(R)
(i) (n) represent the distortion due to δR(i) , which is the first cause of dis-
tortion at the DAC output. The purpose of DAC in ECU is to convert bits into
a physical signal, which is in the form of voltage as shown in Fig. 4.5. The reason
for this conversion is that the signal propagates through a channel in the form of the
physical signal.
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Figure 4.3: Screenshots of the actual and expected waveforms
Semiconductor impurities:
During the manufacturing process, the amount of impurities in the semiconductors
cannot be completely removed. The imperfections in the device material and fabrica-
tion process are the other contributing factors to the observed distortion. Impurities
in the semiconductor cause flicker distortion (also known as 1/f noise) at the DAC
output (84). I represent the distortion due to semiconductor impurities as d
(f)
(i) (n),
which is another cause of distortion at the DAC output.
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Figure 4.4: Distortion in the ECU signal
Non-ideal behavior of low pass filter:
Another contributing factor in distortion is aliasing error that occurs due to non-
ideal behavior of low pass filter used in digital to analog conversion. The digital
signal, which is acquired through the sampling operation on a continuous signal in-
troduces the periodic repetition of its spectra. Let Y
(e)
(i)D
(f) represent the Fourier
transform of y
(e)
(i) (n), which is input in DAC and Y
(e)
(i) (f) represent the Fourier trans-
form in form of continuous signal. Low pass filtering is used to filter out Y
(e)
(i) (f) from
Y
(e)
(i)D
(f) to avoid unwanted copies, which is commonly implemented using a finite im-
pulse response (FIR) filter realization. Eq. (4.5) represents the relationship between
input and output of DAC,
Y
(e)
(i)D
(f) =
∞∑
n=−∞
Y
(e)
(i) (f − nfs) (4.5)
Let H(f) represent the transfer function of the FIR filter, the output of the FIR
filter can be expressed through eq. (4.6).
Y(i)FIR(f) = Y
(e)
(i)D
(f).H(f) (4.6)
Ideally Y(i)FIR(f) should be same as Y
(e)
(i) (f), but due to aliasing error these values
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differs. The non-ideal behavior of FIR realization introduces aliasing at the DAC
output. Let d
(a)
(i) (n) denote distortion due to the non-ideal behavior of the low-pass
filter realization for the E(i). This is the third cause of distortion at the output of
DAC.
DC offset error:
The DC offset error in the DAC is another source of distortion (85). Ideally, the
dominant bit level = 3.5V and ideal recessive bit level = 2.5V as shown in Fig. 4.5,
but, DC offset d
(o)
(i) (n) is added to the ideal voltage value due to grounding issues in
DAC. The total distortion d(i)(n) due to DAC for the E(i) can be expressed as eq.
(4.7),
d(i)(n) = d
(R)
(i) (n) + d
(f)
(i) (n) + d
(a)
(i) (n) + d
(o)
(i) (n). (4.7)
Similarly, we can derive from eq. (4.3) that:
y
(a)
(i) (n) = y
(e)
(i) (n) + d(i)(n). (4.8)
Therefore, eq. (4.8) validates my hypothesis that distortion added in the received
signal is dynamic, hence it can be an effective measure for fingerprinting the ECUs.
The device-specific distortion is also unique for each pin within the E(i) that can
be represented as E(i,l); where { l ∈ ζ | ζ = 1, 2, . . . , λ } are total No. of pins
within E(i). This also elaborates that for attack modeling I need to determine the
affected ECU and the relevant pin. Additionally, pin-level artifacts are effective to
detect spoofing attacks launched from a different pin of the same ECU. Recently,
Sang et. al. (86) demonstrated voltage-based attack to permanently damage a pin of
the target ECU. A voltage-based attack is launched by an adversary, which sends a
high voltage through a pin (which has the maximum capacity of 5V ) to damage the
pin permanently. However, by fingerprinting the E(i,l) we can avoid these attacks.
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Figure 4.5: Ideal voltage levels for CAN
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Figure 4.6: Histograms of d(i)(n) for ECU E(1)-E(7)
4.2.3 Density Estimation
After distortion modeling, I use d(i)(n) for histogram generation. The histogram
will then be used as fingerprints for E(i) and E(i,l). In order to make histogram I need
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to group the distortion values in m histogram bins with step size β, which can be
computed as in eq. (4.9).
β =
(
U − L
m
)
(4.9)
Where U, and L represents the lower and upper values for distortion, and m
represents the number of bins. In my case m = 200, thus, step size β becomes 10−3.
The histogram h(i)(k) for N = 1500 samples of d(i)(n) is computed using eq. (4.10).
Here, k = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,m}.
h(i)(k) =
N∑
n=1
[
δ
(
d(i)(n)
β
+ 100
)
+ h(i)(k)
]
(4.10)
Where δ(.) denotes Kronecker delta function (87), that can be computed through
eq. (4.11).
δ(n−k) =
 1 : n = k0 : Otherwise (4.11)
Fig. 4.6 shows the histogram h(i)(k) of E(1)–E(7). Afterwards h(i)(k) is used as
feature set X(i) = {x(1), x(2), . . . , x(m)}.
4.2.4 ANN based Model Learning
A double artificial neural network (ANN)-based model is used to identify the
source ECU and the corresponding pin. For this the ANN getsX(r) = {x(1),x(2), . . . ,x(R)}
as input-set, and corresponding ECU-, and pin-labels Y(r,e) = {y(1,e), y(2,e), . . . , y(R,e)}
Y(r,p) = {y(1,p), y(2,p), . . . , y(R,p)} respectively; and it predicts the ECU-labels and corre-
sponding pin-labels as Yˆ (r,e) = {yˆ(1,e), yˆ(2,e), . . . , yˆ(R,e)} and Yˆ (r,p) = {yˆ(1,p), yˆ(2,p), . . . , yˆ(R,p)}
respectively, where e ∈ γ, p ∈ ζ, and r ∈ R. The classifier is trained on the dataset
with three hidden layers having v neurons (in my case v = 10) and ”scaled conjugate
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gradient back propagation” method for weight optimization. In the training phase,
this model learns the weight vector represented by: ωe = {w(1), w(2), . . . , w(m)} for all
E(i) and ωp = {w(1), w(2), . . . , w(m)} for all E(i,l). The output of both networks are
then merged as final output in the testing phase (Fig. 4.7). The ANN-architecture for
ECU recognition is presented in Table 4.1, and same architecture is used for ECU-pin
recognition as well.
Figure 4.7: Merged neural network structure
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Table 4.1: Summary of neural network structure
INPUT
Input: −→x(r) = (x(1), x(2), . . . , x(m)) dim(−→x ) = 1×m (I.1)
MIDDLE (HIDDEN) LAYERS (1–3)
Input:
−→
b = U
−→
X dim(
−→
b ) =1 × v (I.2)
Output: −→c = f(b) dim(−→c ) =1 × v (I.3)
U: m × v weight matrix
f: 1
1+ e−b
OUTPUT LAYER
Input:
−→
d = we
−→c dim(−→d ) =1 × v (I.4)
Output: −→e = g(d) dim(−→e ) =1 × v (I.5)
we : v × m weight matrix
g: 1
1+ e−d
ERROR CORRECTION
Cost: E = − ∑ni=1[y(r,e)log(c)] (I.6)
∆Wij = −α∂E/∂Wvm = αδicj (I.7)
∆Umv = −β∂E/∂Umv (I.8)
4.3 Experiments and Results
4.3.1 Experimental Setup
The proposed approach evaluates inter-class- (amongst ECUs), and intra-class-
(amongst ECU-pins) variability, for message authentication. For inter-class variabil-
ity, seven ECUs (transmitters) of the same make and model was used in this study
and data was recorded through the CANH pin. For intra-class variability, six DAC
pins of the same ECU were analyzed to determine the pin-level characteristics.
The hardware comprised of seven Arduino UNO-R2 micro-controller kits; 7 CAN-
Bus shield boards withMCP 2515 CAN-bus controllers, MPC 2551 CAN transceivers;
and a DS O1012A oscilloscope to record the voltage samples with a sampling rate of
20Msa/s, with 100MHz bandwidth. MatlabR 2018a software was used for statistical
data analysis of the sampled signals. A computer simulation was written that con-
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tinuously transmitted the messages from different ECUs and pins. Afterward, these
messages were then used as the dataset for model training and evaluation.
4.3.2 Dataset Description
The ECU identification dataset comprised of 1295 (7 × 185) records with 1500
samples in each record. Whereas, for pin-level identification, a dataset was collected
for six different pins of each transmitting ECU with 40 records for each pin. The
dataset used here was collected in the same environment, i.e., under the same tem-
perature and using an identical message to observe the unique variations of the digital
signals. For performance evaluation, 70% of a randomly selected dataset was used
for training and the 30% of the data for testing purposes.
4.3.3 Performance Evaluation Measures
For performance evaluation, I used true positive (TP), true negative (TN), false
positive (FP), false negative (FN), precision, recall, F1 score, accuracy, and error rate
as performance evaluation measures. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
method, I determined how many ECUs were correctly identified in the response to
messages sniffed by E(s). Let TP represents true positive rate, FP represents false
positive rate, TN represents true negative rate, and FN represents false-negative
rate, then precision can be defined as follows:
Precision =
(
TP
TP + FP
)
(4.12)
Precision was used to measure the ratio of the true instances against the retrieved
instances for a particular class. To measure the sensitivity I used the recall rates that
can be computed as follows:
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Recall =
(
TP
TP + FN
)
(4.13)
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Figure 4.8: Density approximation of distortion
The recall was computed to measure the total number of relevant instances that
were actually retrieved. In order to combine both measures i.e. precision, and recall
I used F1 Score that was computed as:
F1 score = 2×
(
Precision × Recall
Precision + Recall
)
(4.14)
The higher F1 Score signifies the robustness of the classification approach. In order to
evaluate the overall performance by considering all the classes together, I computed
the accuracy of the method as follows:
Accuracy =
(
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
)
(4.15)
Accuracy was computed to measure all instances that were correctly classified,
despite the fact, whatever class they belong to. Moreover, by using accuracy value I
also computed the overall error rate of the method as follows:
Error–rate = 1− Accuracy (4.16)
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Figure 4.9: Effectiveness of feature-set
4.3.4 Feature Stability
The purpose of this experiment is to validate that different ECUs, even of the same
make and model, introduce different artifacts while transmitting an identical message;
and this uniqueness can be exploited to counter the spoofing attacks. To achieve this
goal, all ECUs transmitted the same messages over the same channel with constant
settings regarding temperature, and environment. To validate the claim of ECU-
specific distortion, data were recorded for each ECU with identical channel inputs
and transmission parameters. To verify uniqueness, I estimated distortion density
function by applying Spline function (88) over histogram h(i)(k) to get fni(n) as shown
in Fig. 4.8. Estimated distortion distribution represents the physical characteristics
of each ECU. In order to find the stability, I generated fni(n) of each ECU for 100
times and computed mean and standard deviation (STD). From Fig. 4.9, it can be
observed that the difference between the mean and mean ± STD is negligible, which
shows that the feature-set remains constant over time for each ECU. Hence, it is
proved that the proposed feature extraction approach induces the unique attributes
for ECU representation that makes it effective for ECU identification.
To further validate the unique attribute of the proposed method I plotted fni(n)
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Figure 4.10: Estimated distortion distributions for all 7 ECUs
for seven ECUs as shown in Fig. 4.10, which clearly shows that each ECU has a
unique representation. The benefit of the uniqueness is that the attacker cannot
replicate an ECU’s profile, thus signifies that my approach is robust against spoofing
attacks.
4.3.5 ECU-Level Identification
In this experiment, I have evaluated the performance of the proposed method in
terms of ECU identification. From Table 4.2 it can be observed that the proposed
method achieves very high accuracy for ECU classification. The high accuracy sig-
nifies that the distortion introduced in each ECU due to DAC imperfections and
semiconductor impurities is unique thus results in high accuracy for ECU identifi-
cation. Moreover, it also justifies my hypothesis that the distortion due to DAC
and semi-conductor impurities has the potential for ECU fingerprinting for attack
detection. It can be observed from the Table 4.2 that E(1), E(4) and E(7) have 100%
detection rates, that is mainly associated with the high distortion values appeared in
form of high peaks as shown in Fig. 4.6. Moreover, by analyzing Table 4.2 in the
perspective of Fig. 4.6, it can also be observed that if distortion is concentrated in
a certain region, it increases the inter-class variability, which is one of the targets of
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this research.
Table 4.2: Confusion matrix for ECU classifier
Target Class
- - E(1) E(2) E(3) E(4) E(5) E(6) E(7) Total%
P
re
d
ic
te
d
C
la
ss
E(1) 185 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
E(2) 0 184 2 0 0 4 0 98.9
E(3) 0 1 183 0 0 0 0 99.5
E(4) 0 0 0 185 0 0 0 100
E(5) 0 0 0 0 183 3 0 98.4
E(6) 0 0 0 0 2 182 0 98.9
E(7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 185 100
Total% 100 99.5 98.9 100 98.9 98.4 100 99.4
Similarly, performance matrix (PM) Table 4.3 shows that E(1), E(4) and E(7) has
100% precision, recall, accuracy and F1 Score rates. Furthermore, E(2) has 99.5%
recall, but as it has only one false negative record, therefore, other performance
evaluation rate slightly drops. On the other hand, E(3) has 99.5% precision, it has
only one false positive, therefore slightly affects the precision.
Table 4.3: Performance matrix of ECU classifier
- Precision Recall Accuracy F1 Score ERR
E(1) 100% 100% 100% 100% 0%
E(2) 98.9% 99.5% 99.8% 99.2% 0.2%
E(3) 99.5% 98.9% 99.8% 99.2% 0.2%
E(4) 100% 100% 100% 100% 0%
E(5) 98.4% 98.9% 99.6% 98.6% 0.4%
E(6) 98.9% 98.4% 99.6% 98.6% 0.4%
E(7) 100% 100% 100% 100% 0%
Fig. 4.11 shows the graphical representation of the ECU identification results. The
high correlation amongst the performance evaluation measures for all ECUs clearly
signifies the reliability of the proposed method. Furthermore, the area under the curve
analysis of the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plots as shown in Fig. 4.12
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Figure 4.11: Bar graph of PM for ECU classifier
also confirms my claim that distortion is an effective measure for ECU fingerprinting,
hence attack detection.
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Figure 4.12: ROC of E(i)
4.3.6 Pin-Level Identification
The purpose of this experiment is to validate that different pins, even from the
same transmitter, introduce different artifacts into the transmitted signal, and the
pin-level fingerprinting can be utilized for a reliable attack profile generation. To
achieve this objective, 6 pins of the same transmitter were used to transmit the same
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message over the same channel with constant settings e.g. temperature, environment,
etc. Table 4.4 shows the classification performance of the proposed method in terms
of a number of samples per class.
Table 4.4: Confusion matrix for pin classification
Target Class
- - Pin(1) Pin(2) Pin(3) Pin(4) Pin(5) Pin(6) Total%
P
re
d
ic
te
d
C
la
ss
P in(1) 38 2 0 0 0 1 92.7
Pin(2) 2 37 0 0 0 0 94.9
Pin(3) 0 0 40 0 0 0 100
Pin(4) 0 0 0 40 0 0 100
Pin(5) 0 0 0 0 39 1 97.5
Pin(6) 0 1 0 0 1 38 95
Total% 95 92.5 100 100 97.5 95 96.7
Table 4.5: Performance matrix of pin classification
- Precision Recall Accuracy F1 Score ERR
Pin(1) 92.7% 95% 97.9% 93.8% 2.1%
Pin(2) 94.9% 92.5% 97.9% 93.7% 2.1%
Pin(3) 100% 100% 100% 100% 0%
Pin(4) 100% 100% 100% 100% 0%
Pin(5) 97.5% 97.5% 99.1% 97.5% 0.9%
Pin(6) 95% 95% 98.3% 95% 1.7%
Table 4.5 shows the performance in terms of different performance evaluation
measures. The performance of the pin-classifier is quantified in terms of precision,
recall, F1 score, accuracy, and error rate. In 2 out of 6 cases, my method achieved 100
% precision, recall rate, accuracy and F1 score. whereas, overall 96.7% pin detection
rate. Although, the pin detection rates are slightly lower than ECU detection rates,
as the pin-detection is a novel concept, so the research efforts can be done in this
area to further generate more interesting findings. The same results are graphically
presented in Fig. 4.13. The area under the curve results as presented in Fig. 4.14
shows that still the pin level detection of the proposed approach is satisfactory.
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Figure 4.13: Bar graph of PM for pin classifier
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Figure 4.14: ROC of pin classifier
4.3.7 Comparison Against State-of-the-art
In this section proposed method is compared against state-of-the-art methods
that are also doing the ECU identification. The performance is compared against
ECU detection using Viden (25), Inimitable characteristics of CAN signal (43) and
VoltageIDS (44).
In (25), Cho et. al. proposed a method named V iden that used voltage profile of
acknowledgment (Ack) bits for transmitter identification. In the first phase, ACK bit
was used to measure the message was originated from the genuine transmitter or not.
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Afterward, voltage measurements were used to generate ECU fingerprints. Based on
these fingerprints, the attacker ECU was identified. In (43), a monitoring unit was
installed in the vehicle that analyzes the electrical CAN signals and computes the
statistical features. These features were then classified to identify the ECU. In (44),
ECU detection based on inimitable voltage characteristics technique was proposed.
The feature vectors proposed in (43) were extended both in time- and frequency
domains, and were classified for ECU identification in (44).
Table 4.6: Comparison with other methods
Research Work Method Accuracy
Cho et. al. (25) V iden 99.57%
Choi et. al. (43) Inimitable Char. of CAN Signal 96.48%
Choi et. al. (44) V oltageIDS 95.54%
This method Distortion based IDS 99.4%
Table 4.6 shows the performance comparison of my method against (44; 43; 25).
From the results, it can be observed that my method is giving higher accuracy as
compared to (44; 43) whereas, it is giving almost the same performance as (25).
However, the main advantage of my method is that feature extraction and message
authentication can be done in any part of the signal without the latency. Whereas
in case of Viden, voltage profile is estimated for message authentication during the
reception of the ACK bit but it also introduces the latency. Hence, from the aspect
of latency, my method is more robust than the Viden.
67
CHAPTER V
Control System Parameters Based Transmitter
Identification
5.1 Introduction
Fully connected autonomous vehicles are more vulnerable than ever to hacking and
data theft. The controller area network (CAN) protocol is used for communication
between in-vehicle control networks (IVN). The absence of basic security features
of this protocol, like message authentication, makes it quite vulnerable to a wide
range of attacks including spoofing attacks. As traditional cybersecurity methods
impose limitations in ensuring confidentiality and integrity of transmitted messages
via CAN, a new technique has emerged among others to approve its reliability in
fully authenticating the CAN messages. At the physical layer of the communication
system, the method of fingerprinting the messages is implemented to link the received
signal to the transmitting electronic control unit (ECU). This chapter introduces a
new method to implement the security of modern electric vehicles. The lumped
element model is used to characterize the channel-specific step response. ECU and
channel imperfections lead to a unique transfer function for each transmitter. Due
to the unique transfer function, the step response for each transmitter is unique.
In this chapter, control system parameters are used as a feature-set, afterward, a
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neural network is used transmitting node identification for message authentication.
A dataset collected from a CAN network with eight-channel lengths and eight ECUs
to evaluate the performance of the suggested method. Detection results show that
the proposed method achieves an accuracy of 97.4% of transmitter detection.
In the modern electric vehicle, CAN is used as a reliable, robust, and simple net-
work protocol for in-vehicle communication. CAN is widely applicable in automotive
industry applications, and it makes the transmission of the messages between the
ECUs and the devices more organized and controllable. This protocol lacks message
authentication, because the sender information in the packet is missing, which makes
it vulnerable to spoofing attacks. In the past few years, security and safety are some
of the major concerns for the vehicle industry. In 2015, Miller et. al. (50) killed the
vehicle engine in the middle of the highway, and they were able to take control of the
vital functionalities of the vehicle like engine, braking unit, etc. The purpose of this
experiment (50) was to convey a message to the stakeholders that the implementation
of security in the electric car is a vital issue. With the advent of autonomous vehicles
(AVs), interest in the safety and security of vehicles is increasing. These autonomous
vehicles are considered a breakthrough in modern technology; however, they come
with cyber vulnerability risks.
Existing state-of-the-art countermeasures against spoofing and impersonation at-
tacks on in-vehicle CAN networks can be divided into (i) message authentication code
(MAC) based approaches (18; 89; 20; 21; 22; 23; 24; 90; 91; 92; 17), and (ii) intrusion
detection based approaches (25; 26; 44; 27; 28; 73; 74; 31; 30; 29; 32; 33; 34; 35; 36;
37; 38; 39; 40; 41; 42; 93; 43; 45; 46; 94). Intrusion detection based approaches can be
further subdivided into, (a) fingerprinting-based approach (26; 25; 44), (b) parameter
monitoring-based approach (73; 74; 31; 30; 29), (c) information theory-based approach
(32; 33; 34), and (d) machine learning-based approach (37; 36; 35; 40; 41; 38; 39).
Current solutions (17; 49) for CAN communication are limited in their ability and
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scope as they are unable to identify the transmitting ECU responsible for the received
packet. This chapter presents a novel approach to identify the source ECU of a CAN
signal to authenticate the message. The idea of fingerprinting the source is also used
for other electronic devices such as microphones(77; 78). In CAN communication,
when a transmitter sends a message, the expected signal at the receiver is a rectangu-
lar waveform. However, due to channel imperfections, it is not a perfect rectangular
waveform. The channel has a transfer function, and the input to this channel is a
rectangular wave, which can be modeled as a step function. Hence, the input to the
receiver can be quantified as the step response of the channel, through which the
signal propagates. Fig. 5.1 shows the step response of the channel to the CAN signal.
It can be observed that the received signal is not the same as the ideal signal. This
chapter proposes a new technique to address the limitations of the existing state of
the art CAN security methods by exploiting the channel based step response; and
then finding the transient, and steady-state parameters like overshoot, peak time,
settling time, peak value, steady-state value, damping ratio and natural frequency.
Furthermore, these parameters are used as inputs to a neural network classifier using
supervised learning to authenticate a message by identifying its transmitter.
Contributions: The main contributions of this chapter are:
• Modeling of channel-specific step response for CAN signals
• Channel-specific step response uniqueness analysis
• Propose a reliable framework for identifying the source ECU of any given CAN
message
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides mathematical
modeling of channel-specific distortion and its uniqueness analysis; it also provides
mathematical modeling of the system; section 5.3 outlines the experimental setup,
data collection, results, and analysis.
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Figure 5.1: Channel specific step response
Figure 5.2: Block diagram of transmitter identification system
5.2 System and Mathematical Modelling
Fig. 5.2 shows the architecture of the method presented for transmitter identifica-
tion for message authentication. This architecture is deployed at fingerprinting ECU
E(FP ) as shown in Fig. 5.3. In this architecture, the subnet has a total of N ECUs con-
nected to N channels, where any ECU can be represented as E(i), λ = {1, 2, . . . , N},
where i ∈ λ. The fingerprinting ECU E(FP ) sniffs the signal transmitted by all trans-
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mitters, and the response due to each channel at the E(FP ) is then used for feature
extraction to generate the feature vector X(r) = {x(1), x(2), . . . , x(M)} for E(i), where
M represents the number of features, r ∈ R and R is the total number of records. The
feature vector is then passed to a neural network architecture, which is pre-trained
on R records for message authentication.
5.2.1 Channel Modeling
The signal transmitted by E(i) represented by x(i)(t) propagates through the i
th
channel (h(i)(t)), the channel behaves like a linear time-invariant system, the output
of the channel is represented as y
(a)
(i) (t). The relationship between x(i)(t) and y
(a)
(i) (t)
can be represented as eq. (5.1). Here, ’∗’ operator represents convolution.
y
(a)
(i) (t) = x(i)(t) ∗ h(i)(t). (5.1)
Shown in the right column of Fig. 5.4 is the equivalent circuit of an infinitesimally
small piece of a transmission line. According to the LEM, the transmission line is
represented as a series resistance (R’), series Inductance (L’), a parallel Conductance
(G’) and a parallel capacitance (C’). Shown in the left column of Fig. 5.4 is the
physical structure of the CAN channel. In this structure, D is the distance between
2 wires, d is the diameter of the wires. Let µ be the permeability, and σ be the
conductivity of the copper. The ideal line parameters R’, C’, L’ and G’ (95) can be
Figure 5.3: Message authentication by E(FP )
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expressed in the following equations:
R′ =
2Rs
pid
(5.2)
L′ =
µ
pi
ln
{
D
d
+
√
(
D
d
)2 − 1
}
(5.3)
C ′ =
pi
ln
{
D
d
+
√
(D
d
)2 − 1
} (5.4)
G′ =
piσ
ln
{
D
d
+
√
(D
d
)2 − 1
} (5.5)
Figure 5.4: LEM for transmission line
I hypothesize that due to manufacturing imperfections, the length of the cable,
h(i)(t) is unique for every channel, so the step response of each channel is unique. In
this research, eight channels are used. Given the circuit is shown in Fig. 5.4, transfer
function can be found relating Vi to V in the Laplace domain. Let Hi(s) represent
the Laplace transform of h(i)(t), which is represented as eq. (5.6).
Hi(s) =
1
L′C ′
[
1
s2 + R
′C′+L′G′
L′C′ s+
1+G′R′
L′C′
]
(5.6)
5.2.2 Signal Acquisition
The E(FP ) acquires the analog signal y
(a)
(i) (t) generated by E(i) and transmitted
through h(i)(t) and converts this signal into digital signal y(i)(n) as represented in eq.
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(5.7).
y(i)(n) = y
(a)
(i) (t)|t=nTs , Ts = 0.5× 10−9 (5.7)
Where Ts represents sampling time of 0.5nsec and the sampling rate of 2GSa/sec
for the signal. The reason to generate y(i)(n) is that the y
(a)
(i) (t) occurs at infinite
instants of time, thus demands large memory to get stored. However, the E(FP ) has
limited memory, therefore, the analog-to-digital conversion is performed.
5.2.3 Step Response Acquisition
After the signal acquisition, the next step is to acquire a step response of the
system. The motivation behind finding the step response is to find control system
parameters that are used as a feature set.
After digitization, an algorithm is used to isolate individual dominant bits from the
CANH bus. This section will focus purely on the detection of the rising and falling
edges of each CANH pulse, such that these pulses can be extracted. Individual
pulses are needed to observe individual step response and model only that single
step response in terms of its control parameters. For the following, assume that a
single ECU’s signal which passes through channel i is being processed, y(i)(n), which
contains X samples in total and K pulses. A small subset of samples from the digital
pulse train y(i)(n) is shown in Fig. 5.5.
To isolate the individual pulses shown in Fig. 5.5 to extract their control param-
eters, an algorithm is designed to locate the edges of each dominant bit. For this
edge detection, first, y(i)(n) is filtered using a P-sample (P = 10) digital moving av-
erage filter to smooth oscillations, reducing the likelihood of false edge detection. By
suppressing high-amplitude oscillations with this filter, there is less chance to detect
oscillations as edges. The new moving average signal is shown in Fig. 5.6 and is
mathematically represented as a difference equation in eq. (5.8). Allow y
(MA)
(i) (n) to
represent the moving average filtered output of y(i)(n).
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Figure 5.5: ECU’s digitally sampled pulse train
y
(MA)
(i) (n) =
1
P
P∑
i=1
y(i)(n− i) (5.8)
Next, the signal is converted to an ideal digital signal by using a threshold of 3V
to classify individual samples as being part of either a dominant or a recessive bit as
shown in eq. (5.9).
y
(D)
(i) (n) =

0, y
(MA)
(i) (n) < 3
1, 3 ≤ y(MA)(i) (n)
(5.9)
Fig. 5.7 shows this digitally-threshold signal. Allow y
(D)
(i) (n) to be the digitally-
threshold signal of y
(MA)
(i) (n).
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Figure 5.6: Moving average pulse train
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Figure 5.7: Digitally threshold pulse train
The ideal digital signal contains no oscillations, the digital derivative of the digital
signal y
(D)
(i) (n) is found using the first difference, as shown in eq. (5.10), to find the
rising and falling edges.
dy
dn
y
(D)
(i) (n) = y
(D)
(i) (n)− y(D)(i) (n− 1), n = 0, 1, ..., X − 1 (5.10)
All rising edges are now shown by a positive impulse with some delay, in samples,
while all falling edges are shown by a negative impulse, as shown in Fig. 5.8. All
non-edges assume a value of zero. The indices for rising edges and falling edges can
be extracted as shown in eq. (5.11). Allow nrise and nfall to represent the sample
indices of the detected rising and falling edges respectively.
nrise = n|dy
dn
y
(D)
(i) (n) > 0 nfall = n|
dy
dn
y
(D)
(i) (n) < 0 (5.11)
In CAN, it is possible for an ECU to occasionally transmit erroneous pulses which
do not exhibit similar characteristics to a typical dominant bit from this ECU. It is
necessary to remove these anomalies because their signatures will be vastly different
from the typical signature of their respective ECU and channel combinations. One
possible anomaly scenario is when a single CANH dominant bit is significantly shorter
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than the typical dominant bit, which may produce anomalous steady-state parameter
calculations, since the pulse may not have sufficient time to settle and reach its steady-
state. Another anomaly is when a single dominant bit is sent, followed by a second
dominant bit that comes too early. This often results in an abnormally long pulse and
strange transient behaviors. These short and long pulse behaviors are demonstrated
in Fig. 5.9 and Fig. 5.10 respectively.
Pulses similar to those shown in Fig. 5.9 and Fig. 5.10 can be treated as outliers,
and will not be considered at all for training or testing the classification model,
or for deployment. In effect, the fingerprinting ECU is blocked from making any
decisions about the authenticity of these outlier pulses. To remove these outliers, the
following algorithm is formulated. Allow E(T ) to represent the expected pulse length
of a typical CAN pulse, in seconds. Also, allow ∆t to represent some tolerance, in
seconds. Pulses of length T are selected such that the condition is shown in eq. (5.12)
is obeyed.
E(T )−∆t < T < E(T ) + ∆t (5.12)
Since, the current indices stored are nrise and nfall from eq. (5.11), where n
(k)
rise
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Figure 5.8: Rising and falling edges of pulse train
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Figure 5.9: Abnormally short pulse
and n
(k)
fall correspond to the rising and falling edge sample indices of pulse k, length
in T (k) in seconds is computed, and then decide to keep or discard the pulse as an
anomaly using the rule discussed in eq. (5.12):
for 1 ≤ k ≤ K do
T (k) = n
(k)
fall − n(k)rise
if E(T )−∆t < T (k) < E(T ) + ∆t then
Keep n
(k)
fall and n
(k)
rise
else
Discard n
(k)
fall and n
(k)
rise
end if
end for
After removing indices corresponding to the outliers, the kth individual pulse of
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4
Figure 5.10: Abnormally long pulse
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E(i) is extracted, denoted by y(i,k)(n), using the indices nrise and nfall which have not
been discarded. An example of a typical single pulse is shown in Fig. 5.11.
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Figure 5.11: Single pulse
5.2.4 Feature Extraction
After outlier removal, feature extraction is performed to represent each pulse
as a collection of control-theory-based parameters. This reduces a relatively high-
dimensional input into a very low-dimensional representation, which allows for a
lower-complexity model. This low model of complexity is computationally desirable.
The parameters used for this study include peak time, Tp, percent overshoot, %OS,
settling time, Ts, and steady-state value, Vss. Peak time and percent overshoot de-
scribe a second-order system’s transient response while settling time and steady-state
value describe the system’s steady-state behavior. These parameters are described
below:
• Peak Time: The time required for a step response to reach its peak value from
the time that it first begins to rise.
• Percent Overshoot: The percentage by which the step response’s peak value
exceeds the response’s value at steady-state.
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• Settling Time: The amount of time it takes to form the time that the step
response peaks until it has settled within some tolerance of its steady-state
value.
• Steady-State Value: The value that a step response assumes after all tran-
sient oscillation has diminished.
Note that the second-order system is described in the Laplace domain by the
standard equation shown in eq. (5.13).
H(s) =
Kω2n
s2 + 2ζωn + ω2n
(5.13)
The three main parameters in this standard form are known as the natural fre-
quency (ωn), the damping ratio (ζ), and the D.C. gain of the system, K. In this
application, K will not be varied among ECU and receiver combinations, K = 1
for analysis. ωn and ζ are computed using the following relationships, shown in eq.
(5.14), (5.15).
ζ =
| ln %OS
100
|√
pi2 + (ln %OS
100
)2
(5.14)
ωn =
pi
Tp
√
1− ζ2 (5.15)
From these equations, extracting Tp and %OS are theoretically enough to per-
fectly represent an ideal second-order system’s transient response, however, settling
time and steady-state value calculations are included to enhance the model’s predic-
tions since the pulse digitization can cause small errors in parameter calculation. In
addition, the ECUs may not behave exactly as ideal second-order systems, so these
additional parameters could provide the necessary information if the response does
not exactly follow the second-order behavior.
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The algorithm for calculating these parameters is non-trivial. an individual pulse
k from E(i) is analyzed, y(i,k)(n), with length T . First, the peak value is found and
its corresponding sample index, as shown in eq. (5.16) and eq. (5.17).
Vpeak = max(y(i,k)(n)) (5.16)
npeak =n y(i,k)(n) (5.17)
The peak time is computed by finding the number of samples from the sample
before the rising edge occurs to the sample corresponding to the peak value and
multiplying by the sampling period, as shown in eq. (5.18).
Tp = (npeak − nrise)Ts (5.18)
I can calculate the steady-state value, assuming that the pulse does eventually
settle, by selecting some number of samples Q of y(i,k)(n) to average just before the
falling edge occurs, as shown in eq. (5.19). For analysis, I use Q = 10.
Vss =
1
Q
nfall−1∑
n=nfall−Q
x(n) (5.19)
Afterwards, percentage overshoot is computed, represented as a decimal, as shown
in eq. (5.20).
%OS =
Vpeak − Vss
Vss
(5.20)
Lastly, settling time is computed by using a bit more complex of an algorithm.
The first step is to define a kernel window of length J . then the beginning of the
kernel window is aligned with the peak index, npeak, of y(i,k)(n), and it is checked
whether all values of y(i,k)(n) within the kernel window have magnitudes less than
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a threshold, ρ. If not, the kernel is shifted by one sample ahead until either this
condition is met, which means the settling index has been found, or until the end of
the kernel reaches the falling edge of the pulse, indicating the pulse does not settle.
To find the settling time of a single pulse, first, a parameter ρ is selected, which is
the percentage tolerance that a pulse voltage must remain from its steady-state value
to be considered settled. Now, a tolerance value β can be calculated as β = ρVss. A
pulse has settled at index nsettled when the following condition shown in eq. (5.21)
has been satisfied.
Vss − β ≤ y(i,k)(n) ≤ Vss + β, n ≥ nsettled (5.21)
I can re-write eq. (5.21) as shown in eq. (5.22):
|y(i,k)(n)− Vss| ≤ β, n ≥ nsettled (5.22)
The following shows a more mathematical formulation of this algorithm. Allow
n0 to denote the first sample index in which the kernel window overlaps. y
(0)
(i,k)(n) is
the same signal as y(i,k)(n) but with the D.C. steady-state offset removed.
n0 ← npeak
y
(0)
(i,k)(n)← y(i,k)(n)− Vss
while |y(0)(i,k)(n)| > β for all n ∈ {n0, ..., n0 + J − 1} do
n0 ← n0 + 1
if n0 + J − 1 == nfall then
break
end if
end while
nsettle ← n0
Now that the settling index has been found, settling time is calculated by eq.
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Figure 5.12: Artificial neural network architecture
(5.23).
Ts = (nsettle − npeak)Ts (5.23)
The calculated parameters now comprise a lower-dimensional representation of a
single-step response and can be used for pulse classification.
5.2.5 Training Neural Network
After finding the feature-set, any supervised machine learning method includ-
ing support vector machines, artificial neural networks, deep learning, etc. can be
used to achieve this goal. In this part of research, an artificial neural network is
used, implementing the batch gradient descent optimization algorithm to train us-
ing feature vectors from the database. An artificial neural network (ANN)-based
model (Fig. 5.12) is used to identify the source transmitter. For this the ANN gets
X(r) = {x(1),x(2), . . . ,x(R)} as input-set and the output of neural network is the chan-
nel through which the signal propagated, which is further used to identify transmitter
(ECU) for message authentication.
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5.3 Experimental Setup, Dataset and Results
5.3.1 Experimental Setup
The proposed approach evaluates channel variability, to identify channel trans-
mitter (ECU) for message authentication. Eight channels were used in this study
and data was recorded through the CANH pin. The technical specifications of chan-
nels are given in Table 5.1. The hardware is comprised of eight Arduino UNO-
R2 micro-controller kits; eight CAN-Bus shield boards with MCP 2515 CAN-bus
controllers, MPC 2551 CAN transceivers; and a DS O1012A oscilloscope using a
2GSa/s sampling rate and 100MHz bandwidth to record the measured voltage sam-
ples. MatlabR 2018a software was used for the analysis of the recorded samples. A
computer simulation was written that continuously transmitted the messages from
different ECUs and pins. Afterward, these messages were then used as the dataset
for model training and evaluation.
Table 5.1: Technical specifications of channels
Label Length(m) Conductor Insulation Model
Class –1 2 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-15
Class –2 6 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-15
Class –3 10 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-15
Class –4 2 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-19
Class –5 6 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-19
Class –6 2 Copper XLPO SAE J1128
Class –7 6 Copper XLPO SAE J1128
Class –8 10 Copper XLPO SAE J1128
5.3.2 Dataset Description
A dataset consisting of CAN packets at the output of 8 channels is recorded using
an oscilloscope. There are 8 CAN channels, and 991 records in total comprising the
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Table 5.2: Confusion matrix for transmitter classifier
Target Class
- - Class –1 Class –2 Class –3 Class –4 Class –5 Class –6 Class –7 Class –8 Acc. %
P
re
d
ic
te
d
C
la
ss
Class –1 115 0 0 8 0 0 1 0 92.7
Class –2 0 116 0 0 2 0 0 0 98.3
Class –3 0 0 118 0 0 0 0 0 100
Class –4 9 0 0 114 0 0 0 0 92.7
Class –5 0 3 0 0 125 0 0 0 97.7
Class –6 1 0 0 0 0 122 2 0 97.6
Class –7 0 0 0 0 0 0 129 0 100
Class –8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 126 100
Acc. % 92 97.5 100 93.4 98.4 99.2 98.5 100 97.4
dataset. For model evaluation, 70% of the dataset is randomly partitioned into a
training set and 30% into testing set respectively. All data used is collected under
the same controlled conditions i.e. under the same temperature and using identical
message patterns to observe the unique behaviors of the sampled signals.
5.3.3 Performance Evaluation Measures
I used precision, recall, F1Score, accuracy and error rate as performance evalua-
tion measures. The effectiveness of the method proposed is determined by the rate
at which transmitters were correctly identified in the response to messages sniffed
by E(FP ). Let TP represent the number of true positive predictions, FP represents
the number of false-positive predictions, TN represents the number of true negative
predictions, and FN represents the number of false-negative predictions. Precision,
recall, F1 –Score, accuracy and error rate are computed which are as follows:
Precision =
(
TP
TP + FP
)
(5.24)
Recall =
(
TP
TP + FN
)
(5.25)
F1–score = 2×
(
Precision × Recall
Precision + Recall
)
(5.26)
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Accuracy =
(
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
)
(5.27)
Error–rate = 1− Accuracy (5.28)
5.3.4 Experimental Results and Analysis
A series of experiments are performed for performance evaluation. For the per-
formance evaluation presented, a neural network classifier is trained on the feature
vectors of all different channels. It is important to highlight here that the selection
of neural networks for the classifier is just a matter of choice and not a limitation of
the proposed method. Classification accuracy is used as a performance measure here.
Table 5.2 shows that the method proposed achieves a correct detection rate of 97.4%.
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Figure 5.13: Bar graph of PM for channel classifier
Fig. 5.13 gives a visual representation of various useful metrics in the perfor-
mance measurement of the classifier. The ideal classifier will have a precision, recall,
accuracy, and F1 –Score of 100%, and an error of 0%. Table 5.3 shows the numerical
performance metrics per ECU-channel combination. A relatively good performance is
observed when looking at the accuracy and error scores, which only considers whether
each prediction was correct or not. Thus, the accuracy and error consider TN and
86
TP both as correct predictions, and FN and FP predictions as incorrect. These
are useful metrics to get an idea for how the model performs, but they do not give
much insight into where the failures in the model exist. Precision and recall scores
are useful for this purpose. The F1 –Score combines the recall and precision into one
score, which gives another comprehensive summary of model performance.
Table 5.3: Performance matrix of ECU classifier
- Precision Recall Accuracy F1 –Score ERR
Class –1 92.7% 92.0% 98.1% 92.4% 1.9%
Class –2 98.3% 97.4% 99.5% 97.9% 0.5%
Class –3 100% 100% 100% 100% 0.0%
Class –4 92.7% 93.4% 98.3% 93.1% 1.7%
Class –5 97.7% 98.4% 99.5% 98.0% 0.5%
Class –6 97.6% 100% 99.7% 98.8% 0.3%
Class –7 100% 97.7% 99.7% 98.8% 0.3%
Class –8 100% 100% 100% 100% 0%
The receiver operating characteristic curve, shown in Fig. 5.14, depicts the true-
positive rate (TPR) and false-positive rate (FPR) plotted against each other. In the
ideal case, the TPR will be 100% and FPR will be 0%. This means that the area
under the ROC curve is 1 in the ideal case. With an imperfect classifier, this curve
will begin to bend such that the area under the curve is reduced. Comparing the area
under the ROC curve is one way to determine which classes were predicted best and
worst by the model. Using Fig. 5.14, it is observed that Class –1 is the least similar
to the ideal case. Note that this bend in the curve for Class –1 shows that initially
if there are no false positives, there will not be high true positive rate. The other
classes show that they can achieve very high TPR without much sacrifice in FPR.
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Figure 5.14: Receiver operating characteristic curve
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CHAPTER VI
Channel Specific Distortion Based Transmitter
Identification Using Neural Networks
6.1 Introduction
Cyberattacks on financial and government institutions, critical infrastructure, vot-
ing systems, businesses, modern vehicles, etc., are on the rise. Fully connected au-
tonomous vehicles are more vulnerable than ever to hacking and data theft. This
is due to the fact that the industry still relies on a controller area network (CAN)
protocol for in-vehicle control networks. The CAN protocol lacks basic security fea-
tures such as message authentication, which makes it vulnerable to a wide range of
attacks including spoofing attacks. This chapter presents a novel method to protect
CAN protocol against packet spoofing, replay and denial of service (DoS) attacks.
The proposed method exploits physical unclonable attributes in the physical channel
between transmitting and destination nodes and uses them for linking the received
packet to the source. Impurities in the physical channel, imperfections in design, ma-
terial, and length of the channel are contributing factors behind physically unclonable
artifacts. The lumped element model is used to characterize channel-specific distor-
tions. Non-parametric modeling is used to estimate distortion distribution, which is
used for transmitting node identification. The performance of the proposed method
89
is evaluated on a dataset collected from a CAN network with channel lengths of 1
to 10 meters. Detection results show that the proposed method achieves the average
accuracy of 99.8% with a false positive rate of 0.2%.
This research proposes a novel technique to address the aforementioned limitations
in the existing state of the art CAN security by exploiting uniqueness in the channel-
specific artifacts. Fig. 6.1 shows the comparison between the ideal CAN waveform
and the actual waveform at the receiver. It can be observed that the channel-specific
distortions do exist in the received signal, and they depend on the underlying physical
channel.
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Figure 6.1: Channel-specific distortion in the CAN signal
This research hypothesizes that the distortion in the signal is physically inimitable,
which can be used to link the signal to the channel. The proposed method exploits
uniqueness in the channel-specific distortion for linking the received CAN packet to
the transmitting source. The impurities in the physical channel, imperfections in
design, material and length of the channel contribute to the uniqueness of received
signal. The lumped element model (for the transmission lines) is used to characterize
channel artifacts. Kernel density estimation, a non-parametric density estimation
approach, is used to estimate the distribution of the artifacts. Estimated distribution
is used for transmitting node identification. The performance of the proposed method
is evaluated on a dataset collected from a CAN network with channel lengths of 1 to
10 meters.
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Contribution: Main contributions of this chapter are:
• To model channel-specific distortion for CAN channel.
• Channel-specific distortion extraction and its uniqueness analysis
• To propose a reliable framework for linking received CAN packet to the true
transmitting source.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 provides the system
model, mathematical modeling of the channel-specific distortion and its uniqueness
analysis; Details of the proposed method are outlined in section 6.3; Experimental
setup, data collection, and experimental results & analysis are discussed in section
6.4.
Figure 6.2: Block diagram of the proposed system
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6.2 Proposed System Model and Channel Distortion Model-
ing
It can be observed from Fig. 6.1 that the received signal differs from its ideal
level. Distortion in the received signal can be attributed to the physical channel
imperfections and the channel response. The physical CAN channel behaves like
a transmission line on which the signal propagates to carry information from the
transmitting ECU to another ECU. The transmission line can be represented by the
lumped element model (LEM) that breaks the transmission line into smaller segments
(95).
This research hypothesizes that channel-specific distortions, xj(t), are inimitable,
therefore it can be used to link a received network packet to the transmitter. Fig.
6.2 shows the block diagram of the proposed system. In a vehicle, different modules
communicate with each other with the help of electronic control units (ECUs). The
output of the ECU should be ideally a rectangular waveform, but practically it is
not an ideal rectangular waveform, due to distortion added by the digital to analog
converter (DAC). This signal then propagates through the channel which adds some
distortion as well in the signal. The distortion extraction block extracts distortion
from the signal, which is represented by xj(t). In the next stage, the density function
of the distortion estimated is fed into a neural network. The neural network uses a
gradient descent algorithm to find the feature vector which is stored in the database.
The green lines in Fig. 6.2 indicates the training phase and the red lines represent
the identification/testing phase. Once the model is trained, the transmitter cannot
only be identified but also it can be located by feeding the estimated density function
of the signal to the trained classifier. The trained classifier uses feature vectors and
estimated density function to identify the transmitter using the channel distortion as
a signature.
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Shown in the right column of Fig. 6.3 is the equivalent circuit of an infinitesimally
small piece of a transmission line. According to LEM, the transmission line is repre-
sented as a series resistance (R’), series Inductance (L’), a parallel Conductance (G’)
and a parallel capacitance (C’). Shown in the left column of Fig. 6.3 is the physical
structure of the CAN channel. In this structure, D is the distance between 2 wires,
d is the diameter of the wires.
Figure 6.3: Lumped element model for CAN
Let µ be the permeability, and σ be the conductivity of the copper. The ideal line
parameters R’,C’,L’ and G’ (95) can be expressed as follows:
R′ =
2Rs
pid
(6.1)
L′ =
µ
pi
ln
{
D
d
+
√
(
D
d
)2 − 1
}
(6.2)
C ′ =
pi
ln
{
D
d
+
√
(D
d
)2 − 1
} (6.3)
G′ =
piσ
ln
{
D
d
+
√
(D
d
)2 − 1
} (6.4)
It is important to highlight that the material and the manufacturing imperfections
are expected to contribute a small change (say δ) in the expected line parameter
values. Therefore, true values of line parameters can be expressed as: R′n = R
′ + δR,
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L′n = L
′ + δL, C ′n = C
′ + δC, and G′n = G
′ + δG. As imperfections are not uniform,
therefore, resulting changes in the line parameters, e.g., δR, δL, δG and δC, can be
treated as random variables which make resulting distortion in the signal traveling
over the channel a random variable.
Similarly, channel material imperfections (impurities) also contribute to trans-
mission distortion. For instance, propagation, up = c/
√
εr, depends on relativity
permittivity εr. Material impurities can cause εr to deviate, which further makes up
to deviate from its expected value. Likewise, these imperfections also cause line pa-
rameters to deviate from their expected values. Channel dispersion is another source
of channel-specific distortions. According to Fourier analysis, when a square wave
travels over a physical channel, it experiences spreading effect. Finally, the channel
length is another source of distortion. Specifically, channel length contributes to at-
tenuation that signal experiences while traveling over the channel. The attenuation
constant, α, is directly dependent on the channel length, which can be expressed as
eq. 6.5,
α = Re
{√
R′ + jωL′
G′ + jωC ′
}
. (6.5)
Uncertainty in line parameters also contributes to uncertainty in α, which can be
expressed as, αn = α + δα.
6.3 Non-parametric Density Estimation
Fig. 6.4 represents the network model of a modern electric vehicle which is a het-
erogeneous distributed real-time system consisting of multiple ECUs interconnected
with an in-vehicle network (73). In the proposed method, there are M sub-networks
connected to each other by the central gateway, and in each sub-network, there are
N electronic control units. The gateway is responsible for authentication of the sig-
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nal. In this model, N = 9 and M can be any positive integer. Hence, the model can
authenticate any number of transmitters based on channel characteristics.
Figure 6.4: Architecture of sub-networks with gateways
Let S(t) be the output of an ECU and xj(t) be the distortion induced in j
th
channel due to environmental factors such as temperature, electromagnetic, etc. The
output of jth channel yj(t), can be expressed, yj(t) = S(t) + nj(t). If yj(t) is the
ideal channel output and y
(a)
j (t) is the actual measurement then the channel-specific
distortion, xj(t), can be computed as eq. 6.6,
xj(t) = y
(a)
j (t)− yj(t). (6.6)
Here, xj(t) is a random variable obeying underlying density, fxj(x). Shown in
Fig. 6.5 is the distribution of xj(t). The density of xj(t) can be used to localize
the source of the received CAN packet. The real challenge here is to estimate the
underlying density of xj(t). Both parametric and non-parametric density estimation
methods can be used to achieve this objective. Kernel density estimation (KDE) - a
non-parametric density estimation method - is used here.
This is a data reduction stage, in this processing stage large dataset, i.e. estimated
channel-specific distortion, xj(t), is processed to extract a feature vector that can be
used for channel identification. The KDE package available with MatlabR, which
supports all known kernels such as Gaussian, logistic, Laplacian, Epanechnikov, etc.
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is used for density estimation. The proposed scheme, however, uses the Gaussian
kernel, i.e. Kg(x) =
1√
2pi
exp(−1
2
u2) for the results present in this research. The
motivation behind the Gaussian kernel is that for a given bandwidth, h, the Gaussian
kernel yields an optimally smooth density estimate (96). Shown in Fig. 6.5 is the
plot of the distribution of channel-specific distortion and estimated density, fˆxj(x),
using Gaussian Kernel.
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Figure 6.5: Distortion distribution and estimated density function
6.3.1 Channel Identification
Estimated channel distortion density is then used for channel identification. To
achieve this goal, both the parametric binary hypothesis testing and the non-parametric
hypothesis testing based on machine learning can be used. As estimated density is
non-parametric, machine learning-based testing is used. To this end, estimated den-
sity, fˆxj(x), is used to train a supervised classifier. Any supervised machine learning
method including support vector machines, artificial neural networks, deep learning,
etc. can be used to achieve this goal.
Shown in Fig. 6.6 is the block diagram of the training and test phases. During
the training phase, the acquired signal from each channel is processed to extract
channel-specific distortion, which is used to estimate the underlying density using
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KDE, fˆxj(x). The fˆxj(x) is used for training a classifier. During the testing phase,
channel-specific distortion is extracted from the test signal, ytest(t), which is used for
underlying density estimation, fˆxtest(x). The fˆxtest(x) is then applied at the input of
a trained classifier for class label assignment.
A neural network with a scaled conjugate gradient back-propagation algorithm is
used for channel classification. Let p1,p2......pk be a set of non-zero weight vectors in
<N (97). The set is said to be a conjugate system with respect to the non-singular
matrix A if the following holds,
pTi Apj = 0 (i 6= j, i = 1, 2, .....k). (6.7)
The set of points w in <N satisfying,
w = w1 + α1p1 + α2p2 + ...+ αkpk, αi ∈ <. (6.8)
where, w1 is a point in weight space and p1,p1......pk is a subset of conjugate system,
is called a k-plane (97). This algorithm adjusts the weights wi such that the error is
minimized. The iterations continue to find the set of wi till error is minimized and
the local minimum is reached. The main purpose of the scaled conjugate gradient
backpropagation algorithm is to find the weights wi in the training phase and then
weights wi for classification in the testing phase.
6.4 Experimental Setup, Results and Analysis
6.4.1 Experimental Setup
CAN channel specifications:
To realize CAN channel, CAN cables commonly used by the automotive industry
under the SAE J1939 standard from 2 manufacturers, are used. To this end, nine
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Figure 6.6: Training and test phases for intrusion detection system
(9) different CAN channels by either varying manufacturer or channel length are
realized. Technical specifications of CAN channels used for performance evaluation
of the proposed method are given in Table 6.1.
ECU and CAN communication:
For CAN communication, Arduino Uno R2 microcontroller kit with CAN bus
shield board with MCP2515 CAN bus controller and MPC2551 CAN transceiver
is used. To avoid device-specific distortions, the same ECU is used for CAN packet
transmission over each CAN channel. The same script is used for sending an identical
message continuously from the same ECU over all channels. For CAN bus data
Table 6.1: Technical specifications of channels
Label Length(m) Conductor Insulation Model
C-1 1 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-15
C-2 5 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-15
C-3 10 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-15
C-4 1 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-19
C-5 5 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-19
C-6 10 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-19
C-7 1 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-19
C-8 5 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-19
C-9 10 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-19
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Table 6.2: Confusion matrix for channel classifier
Target Class
- - C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4 C-5 C-6 C-7 C-8 C-9 Acc. %
P
red
icted
C
lass
C-1 128 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 98.5
C-2 0 128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
C-3 0 0 128 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
C-4 0 0 0 128 0 0 0 0 0 100
C-5 0 0 0 0 128 0 0 0 0 100
C-6 0 0 0 0 0 128 0 0 0 100
C-7 0 0 0 0 0 0 126 0 0 100
C-8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 128 0 100
C-9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 128 100
Acc. % 100 100 100 100 100 100 98.4 100 100 99.8
acquisition, Oscilloscope DSO1012A for the voltage samples recording with Sampling
Rate of 2GSa/s, 100MHz bandwidth, and 8-bit vertical resolution, is used.
6.4.2 Dataset Description
A dataset consisting of CAN packets at the output of 9 channels is recorded using
an oscilloscope. For each CAN channel realization, 460,800 (3600*128) samples are
collected. There are 9 CAN channel, so in total 4,147,200 (3600*128*9) samples are
collected. For performance evaluation, random partitioning is performed to divide
the dataset into the training and test sets. For Training set: 70% and for Test set:
30% of the data is used. The dataset used here is collected in the same environment
i.e. under the same temperature and using an identical message to observe the minute
and unique variation of the digital signals. It can be observed from Table 6.2 that
the proposed method achieves very high transmitter classification accuracy.
6.4.3 Experimental Results and Analysis
A series of experiments are performed to evaluate the performance of the proposed
method. For the performance evaluation presented, a neural network classifier is
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trained on estimated densities for different channels. It is important to highlight here
that the selection of neural networks for the classifier is just a matter of choice and not
a limitation of the proposed method. Classification accuracy is used as a performance
measure here. Table 6.2 shows that the proposed method achieves an overall correct
detection rate of 99.8%.
Experiment 1 - Channel-specific distortion discrimination:
The goal of this experiment is to investigate the characteristics of a channel-specific
distortion. To achieve this objective, the estimated density for each CAN-channel is
compared. Shown in Fig. 6.7 are the plots of estimated densities for all 9 CAN
channels. It can be observed from Fig. 6.7 that the estimated densities are different.
It is important to highlight that the estimated densities from C-4 and C-7 are hard
to differentiate. This is due to the fact that both channels are of the same length.
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Figure 6.7: Estimated distortion density comparison
Experiment 2 - Channel identification:
Validating the uniqueness of channel-specific features is the main purpose of this
experiment. This part of research hypothesize that channel-specific distortions are
unique due to the unique material and the design imperfections in the channel. To
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validate this claim, data is recorded for each cable family and each channel length
with an identical channel input, transmitted using the same ECU. Specifically, for
this experiment ‘cable type’ and ‘length’ are the only variables. For this experiment,
a feature vector consisting of 2001 points (which is the dimension of an estimated
density function) is considered. During the training phase, a neural network is trained
on estimated densities (shown in Fig. 6.7) for all CAN channels. The neural network
is trained with a “scaled conjugate gradient backpropagation” training algorithm,
with 2001 input nodes, 10 hidden nodes and 9 output nodes, stopping criteria of
Epochs = 2000 and gradient = 10−7.
Shown in Table 6.2 are the confusion matrices for the channel (CAN) classification.
It can be observed from Table 6.2 that the proposed method achieves an overall
correct detection rate of 99.8%. The proposed method achieves detection accuracy
comparable with existing state-of-the-art. For instance existing voltage-based IDSs
proposed in (44; 25) and (45) reported detection rates of 96.48%, 99.8% and 99.85%,
respectively. It can also be noticed from Table 6.2 that CAN channel C-1 and C-
7 are the only sources of error here, that is, these channels are of the same length
and model. If these 2 channels are ignored, then the proposed system achieves a
perfect detection rate of 100%. This method has advantage over other fingerprinting
IDS based approaches. Since this approach uses the distortion of the channel as a
signature, it is nearly impossible for any transmitter to inject the distortion based
signature. The proposed method in this research also faces a limitation, if a legitimate
ECU is removed from its location and an adversary ECU is connected to the same
place in the network, in that scenario, the proposed framework is unable to detect
the spoofing attack.
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CHAPTER VII
Statistical Parameters Based Transmitter
Identification
7.1 Introduction
Controller area network (CAN) is used as a legacy protocol for in-vehicle data
communication between electronic control units (ECUs). Moreover, this protocol is
also used to provide an interface between the vehicles and the external world via the
internet; thus, makes it vulnerable to spoofing attacks. The primary reason behind
vulnerability is that the sender’s information in CAN messages is missing; hence, the
receiving ECU is unable to authenticate an incoming CAN packet that may be in-
jected by an adversary. In order to overcome this vulnerability, this research proposes
a framework for message authentication through channel identification. The pro-
posed distortion based intrusion detection system (DIDS) exploits channel distortion
to create a unique fingerprint of the CAN signals and link the received packet to the
transmitter. For message authentication, a novel parametric approach is developed
to quantify the distortion in form of probability density function (PDF). The best
fit PDF over histogram of distortion, is gamma distribution function. Afterwards,
the α and β parameters of gamma distribution function are computed for multiple
records in each channel to obtain the joint density function. Finally, the likelihood
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ratio test is applied on joint density function to identify the channel and transmitter.
Experimental results shows that my method is robust and computationally efficient
with less processing requirements for message authentication.
The modern electric vehicle is a cyber-physical system (CPS) equipped with many
wireless and wired communication interfaces to connect ECUs through various in-
vehicle networks (IVNs) (8; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5), such as the CAN (8), LIN (1), MOST (2),
FlexRay (3), etc. These networks connect safety-critical components of the vehicle
e.g. brakes, airbags, engine control, adaptive cruise control, and electronic stability
program, etc. through ECUs (14; 98). Integration of wireless interfaces, e.g., Blue-
tooth, Wi-Fi, etc., with IVNs pose serious security threats to electric vehicles (9),
because the CAN is prone to variety of internal as well as external attacks includ-
ing packet spoofing attacks, data injection attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks,
etc. (16; 15; 14; 99; 17) as CAN does not take into account the sender’s information
for message authentication. Recently, researchers have successfully hijacked vehi-
cles from a remote location, and killed the vehicle engine in middle of a highway
(16; 10; 11; 12; 13; 100). In case of autonomous vehicles (AVs), it is highly likely
that concerted attackers might take a vehicle or its occupants hostage for a ransom,
or direct an AV to relocate it to an unintended destination, etc. Thus, automakers
and other stakeholders are focused on developing safeguards against growing attack
vectors before bringing AVs to the marketplace.
Researchers have proposed various solutions to detect and prevent attacks for in-
vehicle control networks. These methods can be classified into 2 types: (i) Message
authentication code (MAC) based methods (18; 19; 20; 21; 22; 23; 24), and (ii) In-
trusion detection systems (IDS) (29; 30; 31; 32; 33; 34; 35; 36; 37; 38; 39; 40; 41; 44;
25; 45; 43; 26; 46; 27; 42). The MAC-based methods, achieve security and privacy
by encrypting the payload of the CAN-packet before transmission. For instance, in
(17), Wang et. al. demonstrated a MAC-based framework VeCure for CAN secu-
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rity. In VeCure, 64-bit MAC for every 64-bit message was transmitted between the
ECUs. Intuitively, the method exhibited high computational cost, 50% additional
transmission overhead, and also required a higher data rate. In (21), Hiroshi et. al.
presented a MAC-based message authentication mechanism for the CAN protocol
against spoofing attacks. The monitoring ECU provided the authentication code for
all ECUs and verified the code for all CAN messages. In (19), Hazem et. al. proposed
a lightweight CAN authentication protocol (LCAP). The LCAP required to append a
“magic number” that was generated by a one-way hash function employed on TESLA
prototype (47). The protocol required 16-bits of the data field to append the authen-
tication code, which still creates 25% overhead. The MAC-based approaches have
the intrinsic overhead that lowers the transmission performance, hence makes them
unreliable for the CAN security (17; 46; 23).
To address the limitations of MAC-based solutions, researchers have proposed
intrusion detection-based approaches for CAN network traffic analysis (26; 27; 21;
19; 48). The intrusion detection-based approaches have lower data rate requirements
because no additional bits are transmitted during the message transmission; hence,
it does not add additional network overhead. In (26), Cho and Shin demonstrated a
clock-based intrusion detection system (CIDS) that used ECU fingerprinting. Each
ECU contained a crystal oscillator known as a clock; the ECU fingerprinting measured
the clock skewness against the received packets and detect the attack. However, Sang
et. al. (28) and Tayyab et. al. (49) demonstrated that CIDS can be bypassed by esti-
mating the clock parameters. In (46), message authentication was performed through
ECU detection by applying higher-order moments of the CAN signal in both time
and frequency-domains. However, this approach was intolerant against the transmit-
ter induction and the performance of the system seriously decays if the number of
transmitters is increased. Therefore, we need an IDS-based approach that extracts
unique fingerprints from the signal, works for a higher number of transmitters, and
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also exhibits low computational complexity.
To address the aforementioned limitations of existing in-vehicle security tech-
niques, a novel IDS-based message authentication approach is presented in this re-
search. This approach exploits the uniqueness in channel-specific distortions e.g.,
channel imperfections, material impurities, length of the channel, etc., for channel
fingerprint generation to identify transmitter for message authentication. This re-
search hypothesizes that signal distortion is channel dependent; hence can be used to
link the received signal to the source transmitter. Moreover, as distortion is channel-
dependent, thus, it is not easy for the adversary to duplicate this information to attack
the CAN. Therefore, I associate the received packet through a specific channel, by
computing channel distortion using a parametric approach. The proposed paramet-
ric approach estimates multiple density functions of distortion, and adopt the best
fit density function to identify the source transmitter. In my case, the gamma distri-
bution function is the best fit density function that is used to compute the α and β
parameters of the gamma distribution. Through empirical analysis, I observed that
the parameters α and β have random nature thus can be represented through a joint
normal distribution function. Afterward, for a test signal, α and β are computed,
that are then used to identify the channel for message authentication and attack
prevention through a generalized likelihood ratio test approach.
Rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2 provides detailed descrip-
tion of the proposed methodology. Section 7.3 covers the experimental results and
analysis.
7.2 System Model
For in-vehicle communication between the ECUs, the expected signal at the re-
ceiving ECU should have perfect rectangular waveform. However, as shown in Fig.
7.1, the expected waveform and the actual waveform received are not the same due
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Figure 7.1: Comparison of expected and actual signal
to channel distortion, and I have exploited this fact for model generation to identify
the CAN channel used to propagate the signal, and the source ECU. For this I have
considered a subnet in CAN that contains ψ = {1, 2, . . . , n} channels represented as
C(j), where j ∈ ψ, with a fingerprinting unit E(s) that sniffs the transmission of analog
signal y
(a)
(j) (t) which propagated through the channel C(j). The E(s) converts the signal
y
(a)
(j) (t) to a digital signal y
(a)
(j) (n) with a sampling rate of 20MSa/sec. Afterwards,
the E(s) computes the expected signal y
(e)
(j)(n) that is used for distortion computa-
tion x(j)(n) by representing the distortion in form of a histogram. The histogram
is then used to estimate the probability density function (PDF) that is gamma dis-
tribution function fˆ(xj) with two parameters αj and βj. For each channel with M
records, the αj and βj are collected in form of vectors i.e. αˆj = [αj1, αj2 . . . αjM ] and
βˆj = [βj1, βj2 . . . βjM ], and due to their random nature, I further compute the PDF
of αˆj and βˆj. Afterwards, the mean µj and the square root of variance (101) which is
standard deviation σj values of αˆj and βˆj are utilized as the channel representation
model. For any test signal after obtaining the αj and βj, the channel and trans-
mitter identification is performed through likelihood test ratio using µj = µαj , µβj
and σj = σαj , σβj . Fig. 7.2 shows the architecture of the proposed method that is
described in detail in following subsections.
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Figure 7.2: Block diagram of the system model
7.2.1 Signal Acquisition
The fingerprinting unit E(s) acquires the analog signal y
(a)
(j) (t) generated by C(j)
and converts this signal into digital signal y
(a)
(j) (n) as represented in eq. (7.1).
y
(a)
(j) (n) = y
(a)
(j) (t)|t=nTs , Ts = 50× 10−9 (7.1)
The Ts = 50 × 10−9 represents sampling time of 50nsec and sampling rate of
20MSa/sec for the signal. The reason to generate y
(a)
(j) (n) is that the y
(a)
(j) (t) occurs at
infinite instants of time, thus demands large memory to get stored. However, as the
E(s) has limited memory, therefore, the analog-to-digital conversion is performed. I
compute expected signal y
(e)
(j)(n) by first using a p–sample digital moving average filter
to smooth high-amplitude oscillations. The new moving average signal, y
(MA)
(j) (n), is
mathematically represented as a difference equation as represented in eq. (7.2).
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y
(MA)
(j) (n) =
1
p
p∑
i=1
y
(a)
(j) (n− i) (7.2)
Where, p = 7 represents the length of moving average filter. The y
(MA)
(j) (n) is
converted to an ideal (expected) digital signal by using a threshold of 3V to classify
individual samples of signal as either dominant bit (logic 0) or recessive bit (logic 1)
as described in eq. (7.3).
y
(e)
(j)(n) =

2.5, y
(MA)
(j) (n) < 3
3.5, y
(MA)
(j) (n) ≥ 3
(7.3)
For the dominant bit, the voltage level is 3.5V and an ideal recessive bit has a
voltage level of 2.5V . In my case, the channel distortion is extracted in the dominant
bits.
7.2.2 Distortion Extraction
After signal acquisition, I acquire the distortion for channel fingerprinting. The
actual signal deviates from expected signal as shown in Fig. 7.3, and quantified as
distortion x(j)(n), which can be captured using eq. (7.4).
x(j)(n) = y
(a)
(j) (n)− y(e)(j)(n). (7.4)
The distortion x(j)(n) as shown in Fig. 7.3 is a random variable, such that
{x(j)(n) ∈ n(j) | n(j) : [L → U ]}, where L = −1.00 and U = 1.00 represent the
lower and upper distortion values respectively. The x(j)(n) is then used for his-
togram computation. The mathematical model of channel distortion is presented as
follows.
The physical CAN bus behaves like a transmission line on which the signal prop-
agates to carry information from one ECU to another ECU. Hence, the CAN channel
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Figure 7.3: Distortion in the signal
can be represented by the lumped element model (LEM) (95) as shown in Fig. 7.4.
According to LEM, the transmission line with the diameter D of outer cable shield
and, with the diameter d of the inner copper wire can be modeled by circuit elements
i.e. resistance (R′), inductance (L′), conductance (G′) and capacitance (C ′).
Figure 7.4: Lumped element model
The ideal line parameters R′, C ′, L′ and G′ (95) can be expressed in the form of
eq.(7.5)-(7.8).
R′ =
2Rs
pid
. (7.5)
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L′ =
µ
pi
ln
Dd +
√(
D
d
)2
− 1
 . (7.6)
C ′ =
pi
ln
Dd +
√(
D
d
)2
− 1

(7.7)
G′ =
piσ
ln
Dd +
√(
D
d
)2
− 1

(7.8)
Rs =
√
pifµ
σ
. (7.9)
In the equations above, µ is the permeability,  is the permitivity of the dielectric
separating the 2 copper wires; and σ is the conductivity of the copper. It is important
to highlight that material and manufacturing imperfections (small variation in D and
d) are expected to contribute a small change i.e. δ in the expected line parameter
values. Therefore, true values of line parameters can be expressed as: R′n = R
′ + δR,
L′n = L
′ + δL, C ′n = C
′ + δC , and G′n = G
′ + δG. As imperfections are not uniform,
therefore, resulting changes in the line parameters, e.g., δR, δL, δG and δC , are random
variables that makes resulting distortion in the signal random in nature. Let x
(R)
(j) (n)
represent the distortion due to δR(j) , x
(L)
(j) (n) represent the distortion due to δL(j) ,
x
(C)
(j) (n) represent the distortion due to δC(j) , and x
(G)
(j) (n) represent the distortion due
to δG(j) for j
th channel. Similarly, channel material imperfections (impurities) also
contribute to transmission distortion. The velocity of signal propagation, up = c/
√
εr
depends on relative permittivity εr. Therefore, material imperfections can cause up
to deviate from its expected value. Likewise, these imperfections also cause line
parameters to deviate from their expected values. Channel dispersion is another
source of channel-specific distortions. Let x
(D)
(j) (n) be the distortion due to dispersion
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Figure 7.5: Histogram of x(j)(n) for C(j)
which is attributed towards channel impurities. When a square wave travels over a
physical channel it experiences spreading effect (95). The total distortion xj(n) (due
to channel imperfections) for jth channel (Cj), can be expressed as eq. (7.10).
xj(n) = x
(R)
(j) (n) + x
(L)
(j) (n) + x
(C)
(j) (n) + x
(G)
(j) (n) + x
(D)
(j) (n). (7.10)
Similarly, using eq. (7.4), y
(a)
(j) (n) can be expressed as follows:
y
(a)
(j) (n) = y
(e)
(j)(n) + x(j)(n). (7.11)
As x(j)(n) is unique for all the signals propagated over the same channel thus
makes y
(a)
(j) (n) dynamic, hence becomes an effective measure for channel fingerprinting
for message authentication.
7.2.3 Histogram Computation
After distortion modeling, I use x(j)(n) for histogram generation, n = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N−
1}.. The histogram will then be used for density estimation of C(j). Using m bins
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with bin index k, and N = 1500 samples, the histogram is generated as follows:
h(j)(k) =
N∑
n=1
[
δ
(
x(j)(n)
∆
+ 100
)
+ h(j)(k)
]
(7.12)
and
∆ =
(
U − L
m
)
(7.13)
Where ∆ is the step size, L, and U represents the lower and upper values for distortion.
In my case m = 200, L = −1, U = +1. The δ(.) denotes Kronecker delta function
(102), that can be computed through eq. (7.14).
δ(n− k) =
 1 : n = k0 : Otherwise (7.14)
Fig. 7.5 shows a sample histogram h(j)(k) for j
th channel C(j).
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Figure 7.6: Approximation of various PDFs from histogram
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Figure 7.7: Estimating density function
7.2.4 Density Estimation
The purpose of this stage is to find best fit density function fˆ(xj) from h(j)(k).
The real challenge here is how to estimate the underlying density of the distortion
xj(n). Both parametric and non-parametric density estimation methods can be used
to achieve this objective. For density estimation different options are available e.g.
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Figure 7.8: P-P plot
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normal, exponential, rayleigh, gamma, etc. After extensive experimentation, the pro-
posed scheme, however, uses the gamma distribution. The motivation behind gamma
distribution is that for a given histograms, the gamma distribution yields optimally
smooth density estimate (96) as confirmed in (Fig. 7.6). From Fig. 7.6, it can be
observed that the normal distribution also fits the histogram, but as normal distri-
bution is symmetric in nature, and histogram of xj(n) is non-symmetric in nature,
hence, normal fit is not optimal choice. In order to compute the gamma distribution,
I compute the mean µxj and standard deviation σxj of the histogram using eq. 7.15,
and eq. 7.16 and then compute the gamma distribution parameters αj and βj using
eq. 7.17, and eq. 7.18.
µxj =
(∑200
k=0(k × hj(k))
)
(∑200
k=0 hj(k)
) (7.15)
σxj =
√√√√√√√
[(∑200
k=0(k
2 × hj(k))
)
(∑200
k=0 hj(k)
) − µ2xj
]
(7.16)
and
αj =
[
µxj
σxj
]2
. (7.17)
βj =
[
σ2xj
µxj
]
. (7.18)
Afterwards, the gamma distribution function is computed as follows:
fˆ(xj) =
1
β
−αj
j τ(αj)
xαj−1e−βjxj . (7.19)
Here, τ(αj) is gamma function. Fig. 7.7 shows that the density function maps
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Figure 7.9: Scatter plot of α vs β for C(j)
over histogram of xj(n) which signifies that the distortion can be represented through
αj and βj. Fig. 7.8 show the goodness of fit test test. It can be observed that the
theoretical cumulative distribution function which is obtained from histogram of dis-
tortion is very close to the CDF of estimated gamma PDF represented by parameters
αj and βj. By using αj and βj my feature space significantly reduces as well, which
shows that even the simple classification approaches can utilize this information effec-
tively. I repeated this distribution approximation for all channels, and I observed that
the distribution function of all the channels follow gamma density function. There-
fore, if I plot αj against βj for all channels Cj, where each channel has M records
as αˆj = [αj1, αj2 . . . αjM ] and βˆj = [βj1, βj2 . . . βjM ], as shown in Fig. 7.9, we can
observe that the data points corresponding to each channel observe lower intra-class
distance, however, there inter-class distance is high; thus, the benefit of my scheme
is that the data points for each channel Cj becomes linearly separable and can be
captured through data clustering approaches. For capturing data points, I can apply
any data clustering approach i.e. k-means (103), fuzzy c-mean clustering (104) etc.
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Figure 7.10: Distribution functions of α and β
to identify the channel. However, as these methods explicitly required the number of
channels to compute the cluster centeroids, therefore, cannot be used in the situation
where this information is not predetermined. Therefore, in this research I have used
likelihood ratio test (96) as data clustering approach.
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7.2.5 Adaptive Channel Specific Clustering Approach
As it can be observed from Fig. 7.9 that although data points corresponding to
αˆj and βˆj for Cj have lower intra-class distance, but still there is small variation
amongst the data points in α and β planes that highlights their symmetric random
nature. Therefore, in order to capture this symmetric randomness in both planes, I
approximate the PDF of αˆj and βˆj by normal distribution function as described in
eq. (7.20) and eq. (7.21) respectively. The density functions, f(αˆj) and f(βˆj) for Cj
are shown in Fig. 7.10.
f(αˆj) =
1√
2piσ2αj
exp(−1
2
(αj − µαj)2). (7.20)
f(βˆj) =
1√
2piσ2βj
exp(−1
2
(βj − µβj)2). (7.21)
I assume that f(αˆj, βˆj) are independent of each other. By using eq. (7.20) and
eq. (7.21), I compute the joint density function, f(αˆj, βˆj), as described in eq. (7.22).
The joint density function, f(αˆj, βˆj) for Cj is shown in Fig. 7.11.
f(αˆj, βˆj) = f(αˆj).f(βˆj) (7.22)
or,
f(αˆj, βˆj) =
exp
{
−1
2
[(
αˆj−µαj
σαj
)2
+
(
βˆj−µβj
σβj
)2]}
2piσαjσβj
(7.23)
where, µαj , µβj , σαj and σβj can be expressed by eq. (7.24)-(7.27) respectively.
µαj =
∑M
i=1(αji)
M
(7.24)
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Figure 7.11: 3-D plot of joint density function for single channel
µβj =
∑M
i=1(βji)
M
(7.25)
σ2αj =
∑M
i=1(αji − µαj)2
M
(7.26)
σ2βj =
∑M
i=1(βji − µβj)2
M
(7.27)
f(αˆj, βˆj) is used to apply likelihood ratio test to identify the transmitting channel
using the following hypothesis:
Hr : xtest = xr (7.28)
Hq : xtest = xq
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Here, r 6= q, r ∈ ψ, q ∈ ψ, test ∈ ψ, and ψ = {1, 2, . . . , n} and n represents the
unique channel index.
Λ(x) =
f(xtest; θr, Hr)
f(xtest; θr, Hq)
=
Hq
Hr
≶ 1 (7.29)
In eq. (7.29), θr and θq can be expressed as eq. (7.30) and eq. (7.31) respectively.
θr = {µˆαr , µˆβr , σˆαr , σˆβr} (7.30)
and
θq = {µˆαq , µˆβq , σˆαq , σˆβq} (7.31)
Where, µˆαr , µˆβr , µˆαq and µˆβq are show in eq. (7.32) - (7.35).
µˆαr =
∑M
i=1(αri)
M
(7.32)
µˆβr =
∑M
i=1(βri)
M
(7.33)
µˆαq =
∑M
i=1(αqi)
M
(7.34)
µˆβq =
∑M
i=1(βqi)
M
(7.35)
and, σˆαr , σˆβr , σˆαq and σˆβq are show in eq. (7.36) - (7.39).
σˆαr =
√√√√[∑Mi=1(αri − µαr)2
M
]
(7.36)
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σˆβr =
√√√√[∑Mi=1(βri − µβr)2
M
]
(7.37)
σˆαq =
√√√√[∑Mi=1(αqi − µαq)2
M
]
(7.38)
σˆβq =
√√√√[∑Mi=1(βqi − µβq)2
M
]
(7.39)
The decision function considers xtest(n) belongs to r
th transmitter if the eq. (7.29)
is true for all values of q.
Table 7.1: Technical specifications of channels
Label Length(m) Conductor Insulation Model
C(1) 2 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-15
C(2) 6 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-15
C(3) 10 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-15
C(4) 2 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-19
C(5) 6 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-19
C(6) 10 Copper XLPO SAE J1939-19
C(7) 2 Copper XLPO SAE J1128
C(8) 6 Copper XLPO SAE J1128
C(9) 10 Copper XLPO SAE J1128
7.3 Experimental Results and Analysis
7.3.1 Experimental Setup
CAN channel specifications:
To realize CAN channel, CAN cables commonly used by the automotive industry
under the SAE J1939 standard from two manufacturers are used. To this end, nine
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Figure 7.12: Comparison of estimated distortion density for C(j)
different CAN channels by either varying manufacturer or channel length are used.
Technical specifications of the CAN channel used for performance evaluation of the
proposed method are given in Table 7.1.
ECU and CAN communication:
For CAN communication, Arduino Uno R2 micro-controller kit; CAN-Bus shield
board with MCP2515 CAN-bus controller and the MPC2551 CAN transceiver are
used. The same script is used for sending an identical message continuously over 9
channels. For CAN bus data acquisition, oscilloscope DSO1012A for the voltage sam-
ples recording with sampling sate of 20MSa/sec is used. The technical specifications
of channels are provided in Table 7.1.
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Figure 7.13: Comparison of joint density functions
7.3.2 Dataset Description
The channel identification dataset comprised of 1080 (120× 9) records with 1500
samples in each record. For performance evaluation, partitioning is performed to
divide the dataset into the training and test sets. For this 50% of the set is used for
training and 50% of the set is used for testing. The data is collected in the same
environment (i.e. under the same temperature and using an identical message) to
observe the minute and unique variation of the digital signals.
7.3.3 Performance Evaluation Measures
For performance evaluation, I used precision, recall, F1 –score, accuracy, and error
rate as performance evaluation measures. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
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method, I determined how many channels were correctly identified in the response to
messages sniffed by E(s). Let TP represents true positive rate, FP represents false
positive rate, TN represents true negative rate, and FN represents false-negative
rate, then precision can be defined as follows:
Precision =
(
TP
TP + FP
)
(7.40)
Precision was used to measure the ratio of the true instances against the retrieved
instances for a particular class. To measure the sensitivity I used the recall rates that
can be computed as follows:
Recall =
(
TP
TP + FN
)
(7.41)
The recall was computed to measure the total number of relevant instances that
were actually retrieved. In order to combine both measures i.e. precision, and recall
I used F1 Score that was computed as:
F1 score = 2×
(
Precision × Recall
Precision + Recall
)
(7.42)
The higher F1 Score signifies the robustness of the classification approach. In order to
evaluate the overall performance by considering all the classes together, I computed
the accuracy of the method as follows:
Accuracy =
(
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
)
(7.43)
Accuracy was computed to measure all instances that were correctly classified,
despite the fact, whatever class they belong to. Moreover, by using accuracy value I
also computed the overall error rate of the method as follows:
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Table 7.2: Confusion matrix for channel classifier
Target Class
- - C(1) C(2) C(3) C(4) C(5) C(6) C(7) C(8) C(9) Acc. %
P
re
d
ic
te
d
C
la
ss
C(1) 60 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 88.2
C(2) 0 57 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 96.6
C(3) 0 0 59 0 0 2 0 0 0 96.7
C(4) 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 0 0 100
C(5) 0 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 7 89.4
C(6) 0 0 1 0 0 58 0 0 0 98.3
C(7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 0 0 100
C(8) 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 59 0 95.2
C(9) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 100
Acc. % 100 95 98.3 93.3 98.3 96.7 93.3 98.3 88.3 95.74
Error–rate = 1− Accuracy (7.44)
7.3.4 Performance Analysis
This section provides channel detection performance of the proposed method in
terms of evaluation measures. A series of experiments were performed to evaluate the
performance of the proposed method.
Experiment 1 - Channel-specific parametric analysis of distortion:
The goal of this experiment is to validate that the distortion is a channel spe-
cific entity thus has the ability to link the signal to the transmitting channel. The
transmitted signal between ECUs using the transmitting channel does not by default
contains the sender ID, thus is prone to the spoofing attack. However, my approach
extracts the sender information through the signal analysis in terms of channel specific
distortion profile. To achieve this objective, it is necessary that the distortion profile
should be unique for each channel in the CAN network. Therefore, in this experiment
I find the distortion profile for each channel in terms of gamma density function; and
from Fig. 7.12 it can be observed that the estimated distortion densities for all the
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9 channels are unique, which consequently generates unique αj and βj parameters of
gamma distribution for all channels that can be verified from Fig. 7.9. Further, it
can be observed that channels with larger lengths (as listed in Table 7.1) have more
spread in the density functions. This spread on x–axis is due to an increase in the
variance of the density function. Gamma densities of some channels are correlated as
they overlap with each other. If we find probability density functions of αˆj and βˆj for
each channel Cj and their joint density function f(αˆ, βˆ), it can be observed that they
are uncorrelated as they do not overlap each other as shown in Fig. 7.13, the joint
density function of αˆj and βˆj is an ideal candidate for channel identification. Hence,
as the density function of each channel is unique, so it can be used to link the signal
to the source transmitter for message authentication.
Experiment 2 - Transmitter identification based upon channel distor-
tion:
The main purpose of this experiment is to test the accuracy of the channel iden-
tification method proposed in this research. Estimated channel distortion density is
then used for transmitter identification. To achieve this goal, both parametric binary
hypothesis testing or non-parametric hypothesis testing based on machine learning
can be used. As estimated density is a parametric approach, therefore, likelihood is
used. During training phase, the acquired signal from each channel is processed to
extract channel-specific distortion, which is used to estimate the underlying density,
fˆ(xj) and its parameters . Further, fˆ(xj) is computed M times,to generate αj and
βj and find joint density function f(αˆ, βˆ). The f(αˆ, βˆ) is then used to classify chan-
nel. During testing phase, channel-specific distortion (xtest(t)) is extracted from the
test signal (ytest(t)), xtest(t), which is used for underlying density estimation, fˆ(xtest).
Parameters α and β are acquired from fˆxtest(x). Finally, maximum likelihood is ap-
plied for channel label assignment. The experimental results show that the proposed
algorithm achieves a satisfactory performance with a false positive rate of 4.26% and
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identification accuracy of 95.74% as shown in Table 7.2. It can also be noticed from
Table 7.2 that the false positive which appear for CAN channel C(1) are the signals
which belong to C(4) and C(7), these channels are of the same length. The same
pattern can be observed for all the other classes as well, i.e. sources of errors/false
positives are those classes that have the same cable length.
Table 7.3: Performance matrix of channel classifier
- Precision Recall Accuracy F1 –score ERR
C(1) 88.2% 100% 98.5% 93.8% 1.5%
C(2) 96.6% 95% 99.1% 95.8% 0.9%
C(3) 96.7% 98.3% 99.4% 97.5% 0.6%
C(4) 100% 93.3% 99.2% 96.6% 0.8%
C(5) 89.4% 98.3% 98.5% 93.7% 1.5%
C(6) 98.3% 96.7% 99.4% 97.5% 0.6%
C(7) 100% 93.3% 99.2% 96.6% 0.8%
C(8) 95.2% 98.3% 99.2% 96.7% 0.8%
C(9) 100% 88.3% 98.7% 93.8% 1.3%
Table 7.3 shows the performance in terms of different performance evaluation
measures. The performance of channel-classifier is quantified in terms of precision,
recall, F1 –score, accuracy, and error rate. In 3 out of 9 cases, my method achieved
100% precision, as observed from Table 7.3, C(4), C(7) and C(9) have 100% precision.
It can also be observed that C(1) has a recall of 100%. Further, C(3) and C(6) stand out
in terms of F1 –score, they both have an F1 –score of 97.5%. The overall detection
rate of channel identification is 95.74%. The same results are graphically presented
in Fig. 7.14.
7.3.5 Comparison Against State-of-the-art
In this section proposed method is compared against state-of-the-art methods that
are also doing the transmitter identification. The performance is compared against
transmitter detection using Viden (25), Inimitable characteristics of CAN signal (43)
and VoltageIDS (44).
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Figure 7.14: Bar graph of PM for classifier
In (25), Cho et. al. proposed a method named V iden that used voltage profile
of acknowledgment (Ack) bits for transmitter identification. In the first phase, ACK
bit was used to measure the message was originated from the genuine transmitter or
not. Afterward, voltage measurements were used to generate transmitter fingerprints.
Based on these fingerprints, the attacker transmitter was identified. In (43), a moni-
toring unit was installed in the vehicle that analyzes the electrical CAN signals and
computes the statistical features. These features were then classified to identify the
transmitter. In (44), transmitter detection based on inimitable voltage characteristics
technique was proposed. The feature vectors proposed in (43) were extended both
in time- and frequency domains, and were classified for transmitter identification in
(44).
Table 7.4 shows the performance comparison of my method against (44; 43; 25).
From the results, it can be observed that my method is giving accuracy as very close to
(44; 43). However, the main advantage of my method is that feature extraction and
message authentication can be done in any part of the signal without the latency.
Whereas in case of Viden, voltage profile is estimated for message authentication
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Table 7.4: Comparison with other methods
ResearchWork Method Accuracy
Cho et. al. (25) V iden 99.57%
Choi et. al. (43) Inimitable Char. of CAN Signal 96.48%
Choi et. al. (44) V oltageIDS 95.54%
This method Channel Distortion based IDS 95.74%
during the reception of the ACK bit but it also introduces the latency. Hence, from
the aspect of latency, my method is more robust than the Viden. Although, the
channel detection rates are slightly lower than Viden, as the channel-detection using
parametric estimation is a novel concept, so the research efforts can be done in this
area to further generate more interesting findings. In (43), message authentication is
done based on using inimitable characteristics of signal. The feature vector consists
of 40 features both in time domain and frequency domain, further a multilayered
neural network is trained based on this feature-set. This approach is computationally
expensive, hence, it adds a lot of overhead to the system, which makes this approach
impractical to be implemented. Whereas, in my case, there are 2 advantages of
my approach as compared to approach inimitable characteristics of signal which was
proposed in (43). The first approach is that my model is trained only on 2 features
α and β, whereas 40 features were used for training in (43). The second advantage is
that likelihood ratio test is used for channel identification which is computationally
less expensive as compared to neural networks.
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CHAPTER VIII
Conclusion and Future Work
In this research, a novel approach for ECU identification is presented for mes-
sage authentication. The main motivation behind ECU identification is that in CAN
messages, as the sender (ECU) information is missing, therefore, they are prone to
spoofing attacks; however, with the ECU identification, spoofing attacks can eas-
ily be prevented. In this research, the ECU specific distortion is utilized for ECU-
fingerprinting, and ECUs are identified through a 4-layered double Neural network
architecture. The uniqueness of my approach is that it is utilizing DAC imperfections
and semi-conductor impurities that are hard to replicate. The ECU imperfections are
unique for all ECUs even from the same make, model, and manufacturer. Thus, this
information has the potential to prevent spoofing attacks. Another novel contribution
in this research is that the same fingerprinting technique can be used for ECU-pin
identification, which can then be used to avoid pin-level attacks e.g. voltage-based
attacks.
Another contribution of this research is that, it has been demonstrated that the
channel-specific step response in the received signal is unique; hence, it can be utilized
to associate CAN packets with their source transmitter. The proposed system uses
the transient response parameters of the channel to capture uniqueness in the received
signal, which is used as inputs to a multi-layer neural network classifier. The clas-
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sification method’s performance is evaluated on eight different CAN channels. The
experimental results indicate that each channels’ set of feature vectors is significantly
different from all other channels. The proposed method achieves channel detection
with an accuracy of 97.4%.
Another contribution of this research is that it uses a distribution profile of the
channel-specific distortion to capture uniqueness in the received signal, which is used
to train a neural network classifier. The performance of the classification method is
evaluated on nine different CAN channels. The experimental results indicate that
the estimated densities are significantly different even for the same length and man-
ufacturer. This method achieves an accuracy of 99.4% using a single layer neural
network.
The main contribution of this research is using parametric analysis in the received
signal and then identify the transmitter. This method is computationally inexpensive
as compared to other methods. This method achieves transmitter detection with an
accuracy of 95.74%. This method is superior to encryption-based techniques since
it does not adds additional overhead in the system. Hence, it makes the system
robust. It is also superior to machine learning IDS techniques implemented at the
physical layer since it is computationally less expensive as compared to other machine
learning-based techniques at the physical layer. For future work, I will localize the
transmitter based on channel distortion. In case when an attack is detected, the at-
tacker transmitter will be isolated from the CAN, and will not be allowed to transmit
any message. I also plan to test my method at different environmental conditions
i.e. temperature, humidity, and electromagnetic interference, etc. in real-time sce-
narios. In this regard, fuzzy logic-based decision modeling will be employed to adapt
channel-identification corresponding to different environmental conditions.
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